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 The Supreme Court’s decision last Term in NLRB v. Noel Canning contains an 
especially strong and sustained endorsement of the relevance of historical practice to 
discerning the Constitution’s distribution of authority between Congress and the 
President.1  In interpreting the scope of the Recess Appointments Clause,2 the Court gave 
significant attention to how governmental actors had understood and applied the Clause 
throughout history.  The Court did so, moreover, as part of a self-conscious approach to 
constitutional interpretation.  When construing “constitutional provisions regulating the 
relationship between Congress and the President,” the Court explained, “great weight” 
should be given to “‘[l]ong settled and established practice.’”3  In large part because of 
the practice, the Court concluded that the Recess Appointments Clause conferred broad 
recess appointments authority upon the President.  The Court invalidated, however, the 
particular appointments at issue in the case, which in the Court’s view lacked historical 
support. 
 
 The Court was unanimous as to the result, but four Justices concurred only in the 
judgment.4  Writing a de facto dissent for that group, Justice Scalia objected, first, to the 	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1 See 134 S Ct 2550 (2014). 
2 US Const art II, § 2, cl 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may 
happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their 
next Session.”). 
3 134 S Ct at 2559, quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 US 655, 689 (1929). 
4 Noel Canning was one of several decisions in the 2013-14 Term in which the Court was 
unanimous as to the result but deeply divided on the reasoning.  See also Bond v United States, 134 S Ct 
2077 (2014), and McCullen v Coakley, 134 S Ct 2518 (2014).    
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way in which the majority had relied on historical practice.  He accepted that “where a 
governmental practice has been open, widespread, and unchallenged since the early days 
of the Republic, the practice should guide our interpretation of an ambiguous 
constitutional provision.”5  In this case, however, Justice Scalia argued that the relevant 
text was clear, and that the historical practice relied upon by the majority neither dated to 
the early days of the Republic nor was uncontested.  Justice Scalia also characterized the 
majority as applying “an adverse-possession theory of executive power,” which he feared 
would “have the effect of aggrandizing the Presidency beyond its constitutional bounds 
and undermining respect for the separation of powers.”6 
  
 The majority, by contrast, invoked James Madison for the proposition that the 
meaning of some constitutional provisions could be “liquidated” through “a regular 
course of practice” after the constitutional Founding, and it contended that “our cases 
have continually confirmed Madison’s view.”7  The majority did not explain the contours 
of this “liquidation” concept, however, and its reasoning about the scope of the Recess 
Appointments Clause seemed to be based on a potentially distinct and broader concept of 
“historical gloss”—a concept most famously articulated by Justice Frankfurter in his 
concurrence in the Youngstown steel seizure case.8  Indeed, judging from the way in 
which the concept of liquidation has been developed by originalist scholars, it would 
seem to accord more closely with Justice Scalia’s views in Noel Canning than with those 
of the majority. 
 
 Justice Scalia also disagreed with the majority about the clarity of the relevant 
constitutional text.  Justice Scalia and the majority did agree that if the text of the Recess 
Appointments Clause was clear, it controlled the outcome regardless of other 
considerations.  The majority maintained, however, that “the Clause’s text, standing 
alone, is ambiguous,”9 and that it was therefore appropriate to consider other sources of 
constitutional authority, including historical practice.  Justice Scalia, by contrast, argued 
that the text was clear, and he insisted that “[t]he historical practice of the political 
branches is, of course, irrelevant when the Constitution is clear.”10   
 
This Article engages these two disputes in Noel Canning by examining the 
relationship between interpretive methodology and historical practice, and between 
historical practice and textual ambiguity.  We begin in Part I by describing the historical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 134 S Ct at 2594 (Scalia, J, concurring in the judgment). 
6 Id at 2592, 2617-18.  
 7 Id at 2580. 
 8 See Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v Sawyer, 343 US 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J. 
concurring) (“[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress 
and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, 
making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss 
on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”). 
9 134 S Ct at 2577. 
10 Id at 2600. 
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background and issues in Noel Canning.  In the next two Parts, we consider the 
relationship between historical practice and constitutional methodology.  In Part II, we 
explain how a reliance on historical practice fits with various non-originalist and 
originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation.  In Part III, we critique the idea of 
“liquidation” of constitutional meaning to the extent that it is something separate from—
and narrower than—reliance on historical gloss more generally. 
 
We turn in Part IV from the relationship between methodology and practice to the 
relationship between practice and ambiguity.  We explain that historical practice was 
relevant not only to the majority’s effort in Noel Canning to resolve perceived 
ambiguities in the constitutional text, but also to the majority’s very perception of 
ambiguity in the first instance.  As a result, the decision is an example of how the 
constitutional text is often interpreted through a process that we have described elsewhere 
as “constructed constraint.”11  Finally, in Part V we assess Justice Scalia’s contention that 
crediting historical gloss licenses a form of adverse possession by the President.  We 
conclude that Justice Scalia’s analogy to adverse possession usefully suggests caution in 
crediting historical practice, but that the analogy obscures more than it clarifies because it 
misses critical differences between the values underlying the adverse possession doctrine 
in property law and those animating a historical gloss approach to the separation of 
powers.  In responding to Justice Scalia, we also offer thoughts on how best to define a 
historical gloss approach, including how to specify its limits. 
 
I.  Historical Practice and Recess Appointments 
 
A.  A Brief History of Recess Appointments 
 
The Constitution provides that federal officers are to be appointed through 
nomination by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.12  It also provides, 
however, that the President may “fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess 
of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of [the Senate’s] 
next Session.”13  Alexander Hamilton explained in The Federalist that the Framers had 
included this Recess Appointments Clause in the Constitution because “it would have 
been improper to oblige [the Senate] to be continually in session for the appointment of 
officers” and because “vacancies might happen in their recess, which it might be 
necessary for the public service to fill without delay.”14 
 
Each Congress has a two-year term, which traditionally has been divided into two 
yearly sessions.15  The break between those sessions is referred to as an inter-session 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text, 64 
Duke LJ (forthcoming 2015). 
12 US Const art II, § 2, cl 2. 
13 Id, cl 3. 
14 The Federalist No 67 at 410, in The Federalist Papers (Penguin, Clinton Rossiter ed, 1961). 
15 See generally Henry B. Hogue, Recess Appointments:  Frequently Asked Questions (Cong Res 
Serv, June 7, 2013), online at https://www.senate.gov/CRSReports/crs-publish.cfm?pid='0DP%2BP% 
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recess.  By contrast, breaks during a session are referred to as intra-session recesses.  The 
Constitution provides that neither chamber of Congress may take a break for more than 
three days without the consent of the other, which gives the House of Representatives 
substantial ability to affect the length of Senate breaks.16 
 
Historically, there have been three principal issues concerning the scope of the 
Recess Appointments Clause: first, whether the Clause’s reference to “the Recess” covers 
only inter-session recesses, or whether it also encompasses at least some intra-session 
recesses; second, whether the Clause’s reference to vacancies “that may happen during 
the Recess” limits the Clause to vacancies that occur during the recess or whether it also 
encompasses vacancies that exist during the recess; and, third, whether there is a 
minimum time period required in order for a break in Senate operations to be considered 
a “recess” for purposes of the Clause.17 
 
1.  “The Recess” 
 
There was no sustained practice of making intra-session recess appointments 
before the twentieth century.  Prior to the Civil War, presidents apparently made no intra-
session recess appointments at all.  There was relatively little opportunity to do so, 
however, because this was a period in which Congress took very long breaks between 
sessions—typically at least half a year—and no more than short breaks (of about a week) 
during the sessions. 18   When Congress took long intra-session breaks during the 
presidency of Andrew Johnson, he made a number of intra-session recess appointments. 
After this episode, Congress soon returned to having only short intra-session recesses, 
and there were apparently no more intra-session recess appointments until 1920. 
 
In 1901, Attorney General Philander Knox advised President Theodore Roosevelt 
that the Recess Appointments Clause did not apply to intra-session recesses.19  Knox 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5CW%3B%20P%20%20%0A.  The President can also call one or both houses of Congress into session “on 
extraordinary Occasions,” see US Const art II, § 3, and this has happened at various times.  Congressional 
leadership can also call the houses of Congress into special session during a recess. 
16 See US Const art II, § 3.  If the houses of Congress cannot agree on an adjournment, the 
President “may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper.”  Id.  Under Senate practice, Sundays 
are not counted for purposes of the Adjournments Clause. 
17  For discussions of the relevant post-Founding history, see Edward A. Hartnett, Recess 
Appointments of Article III Judges:  Three Constitutional Questions, 26 Cardozo L Rev 377 (2005); 
Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L Rev 1487 
(2005); Jonathan Turley, Constitutional Adverse Possession:  Recess Appointments and the Role of 
Historical Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 2013 Wis L Rev 965; and Michael A. Carrier, Note, 
When Is the Senate in Recess for Purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause?, 92 Mich L Rev 2204 
(1994). 
18 In the post-Founding period, inter-session recesses typically lasted six months or longer.  See 
Rappaport, 52 UCLA L Rev at 1498 (cited in note 17).  When the Senate took intra-session recesses in this 
period, they were typically around the Christmas holiday and lasted only about a week.  See Hartnett, 26 
Cardozo L Rev at 408 (cited in note 17). 
19 23 Op Atty Gen 599, 601 (1901). 
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reasoned that, although a break during a session “may be a recess in the general and 
ordinary use of that term,” it is not “the Recess” referred to in the Recess Appointments 
Clause.20  Controversy subsequently developed when, in December 1903, Roosevelt 
made 160 recess appointments (mostly involving military officers) as the Senate 
transitioned without break from a special session (which had been convened after 
adjournment of the prior regular session) to a new regular session.  Roosevelt claimed 
that there was a “constructive recess” between the two sessions that triggered his 
appointments authority.21  In 1905, the Senate Judiciary Committee published a report 
criticizing the appointments and arguing that “the Constitution means a real recess, not a 
constructive one.” 22   Although the Committee’s functional definition of a recess 
potentially could have been applied to an intra-session recess as well as an inter-session 
recess,23 Roosevelt had not claimed an intra-session recess appointments power, and the 
Report did not specifically consider that issue. 
 
In 1921, Attorney General Harry Daugherty concluded that, contrary to the Knox 
opinion, the President has the authority to make recess appointments during an intra-
session recess. 24   Daugherty explained that the appointments provisions in the 
Constitution are designed to “to prohibit the President from making appointments without 
the advice and consent of the Senate whenever that body is in session so that its advice 
and consent can be obtained.”25  The relevant question as he saw it, therefore, was 
“whether in a practical sense the Senate is in session so that its advice and consent can be 
obtained.”26  Daugherty also reasoned that a contrary interpretation of the Clause could 
lead to “disastrous consequences.”27   
 
Since 1921, executive branch lawyers consistently have interpreted the Clause to 
apply to intra-session recesses.  Particularly since the 1940s, moreover, presidents have 
made numerous recess appointments during intra-session recesses. 28   In 1948, the 
Comptroller General, an officer of Congress, cited Daugherty’s opinion as representing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Id. 
21 See T.J. Halstead, Recess Appointments:  A Legal Overview 10 (Cong Res Serv, July 26, 2005), 
online at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/50801.pdf. 
22 S Rep No 4389, 58th Cong, 3d Sess, p 4. 
23 The Committee explained that a recess is “the period of time when the Senate is not sitting in 
regular or extraordinary session[;] . . . when its members owe no duty of attendance; when its Chamber is 
empty; when, because of its absence, it can not receive communications from the President or participate as 
a body in making appointments.”  Id at 2. 
24 33 Op Atty Gen 20 (1921). 
25 Id at 21. 
26 Id at 21-22. 
27 Id at 23.  See also id (“If the President’s power of appointment is to be defeated because the 
Senate takes an adjournment to a specified date, the painful and inevitable result will be measurably to 
prevent the exercise of governmental functions.”). 
28 See Carrier, 92 Mich L Rev at 2212 (cited in note 17) (noting that “[f]requent presidential use of 
the recess appointment power during intrasession recesses began in 1947” with appointments by Truman). 
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“the accepted view” on the question.29  At various times, however, individual senators 
have disagreed with this view.30 
 
2.  “Vacancies that May Happen During the Recess” 
 
President Washington’s Attorney General, Edmund Randolph, opined that the 
recess appointments power was limited to executive branch positions that become vacant 
during a recess.  Instead of focusing on the semantic meaning of the text of the clause, 
Randolph reasoned that “[t]he Spirit of the Constitution favors the participation of the 
Senate in all appointments” and that the recess appointments power should be viewed as 
“an exception to the general participation of the Senate” and “interpreted strictly.”31  
Despite this opinion, presidents since at least the Madison administration (and perhaps 
earlier) have used the recess appointments power at various times to fill posts that 
became vacant before the relevant recess.32   
 
In 1823, President Monroe’s Attorney General, William Wirt, reached a 
conclusion contrary to Randolph’s, reasoning that the phrase “may happen” “seems not 
perfectly clear,” because it could mean either “happen to take place” or “happen to 
exist.”33  Wirt thought that the first reading would be more consistent with the “letter of 
the constitution,” but that the second would be “most accordant with its reason and 
spirit.”34  He observed that the purpose of the recess appointments power was to ensure 
that offices could remain filled and that if the President could not use this power to fill 
positions that remained vacant when the Senate went into recess, “the powers are 
inadequate to the purpose, and the substance of the constitution will be sacrificed to a 
dubious construction of its letter.”35  After some inconsistency of views within the 
executive branch on this issue through the mid-nineteenth century, the President’s legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 28 Comp Gen 30, 34 (1948).   
30 In 1993, for example, the Senate Legal Counsel drafted an amicus brief, to be filed in a pending 
case, Mackie v Clinton, arguing that the recess appointments power applied only during inter-session 
recesses.  The brief, which was prepared at the request of Senator George Mitchell, was never filed due to 
objections from Senate Republicans.  See 139 Cong Rec 15266-74 (July 1, 1993).  Similarly, in 2004 
Senator Edward Kennedy filed an amicus curiae brief arguing that the President’s recess appointments 
authority is limited to inter-session recesses.  See Brief for Sen. Edward M. Kennedy as Amicus 
Curiae in Franklin v United States, OT 2004, No. 04-5858 (Oct. 12, 2004). 
31 Edmund Randolph, Opinion on Recess Appointments (July 7, 1792), reprinted in 24 The Papers 
of Thomas Jefferson 165-67 (John Catanzariti et al eds, 1990). 
32 See, for example, Hartnett, 26 Cardozo L Rev at 400 (cited in note 17) (“While there is good 
reason to believe that both President Adams and President Jefferson made recess appointments that were 
inconsistent with Randolph's interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause, I am confident that 
President Madison did so.”). 
33 William Wirt, Executive Authority to Fill Vacancies, 1 Op Atty Gen 631, 631-32 (Oct 22, 
1823). 
34 Id at 632. 
35 Id. 
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advisers since that time have consistently agreed with Wirt’s conclusion and have treated 
the question as settled.36   
 
In 1863, the Senate Judiciary Committee issued a report concluding that the 
recess appointments power applies only to positions that become vacant during the 
recess.37  The Committee expressly disagreed with Wirt’s reasoning, pointing out that 
keeping governmental offices filled is not the only constitutional interest at issue, and that 
another interest is ensuring that the offices are filled by well-qualified individuals.  The 
Committee also expressed the concern that, if a President could fill pre-existing vacancies 
during recesses, he could deliberately bypass the senatorial process of advice and 
consent.38   
  
Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the Pay Act, which prohibited paying recess 
appointees who were filling vacancies that pre-existed the recess until the Senate 
confirmed their appointments.39  The Act was enacted in the context of disputes over 
President Lincoln’s appointment of military officers during the Civil War.  The 
legislation was introduced by Senator Trumbull, who said that he did not think that the 
President had the constitutional authority to make recess appointments for pre-existing 
vacancies but that “some other persons think he has that power.”40  Senator Harris 
questioned Trumbull’s constitutional claim, noting, among other things, that “however 
we may read the Constitution, for forty years the precedents have been against that 
theory.”41   
 
Notwithstanding the Act, the executive branch continued to endorse Wirt’s 
conclusion about the scope of the Recess Appointments Clause, and presidents continued 
to make occasional recess appointments to pre-existing vacancies.  Congress paid those 
appointees retroactively after they were confirmed, and sometimes voted to pay them 
even if they were not confirmed.  In 1927, the Comptroller General expressed the view 
that “there is no question but that the President has authority” to make those 
appointments.42  In 1940, Congress amended the Pay Act to allow for the payment, under 
various conditions, of recess appointees who were filling pre-existing vacancies.43  
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 See Halstead at 5-6 (cited in note 21).  
37 See S Rep No 80, 37th Cong, 3d Sess (Jan 28, 1863).  The Committee also expressed the view 
that the recess appointments power applied only to inter-session recesses.  See id at 3. 
38 Id at 6.  See also id (“In the hands of an ambitious, corrupt, or tyrannical executive, this use of 
the power would soon bring about the very state of things which the Constitution so carefully guards 
against, by requiring, in express terms, that the advice of the Senate shall first be taken, and its consent 
obtained, before an appointment shall be made.”). 
39 See Act of Feb. 9, 1863, ch 25, § 2, 12 Stat 642, 646 
40 Cong Globe, 37th Cong, 3d Sess 565 (Jan 29, 1863). 
41 Id.   
42 7 Comp Gen 10, 11 (1927). 
43 See Act of July 11, 1940, ch 580, 54 Stat 751 (codified, as amended, at 5 USC § 5503). 
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 3.  Duration of the Senate Break 
 
 The duration of the break taken by the Senate generally has not been a significant 
issue for inter-session recess appointments.  The one exception is the controversy, noted 
above, about Theodore Roosevelt’s appointments in 1903 during an instantaneous 
transition between Senate sessions.  On other occasions, there has not been much 
controversy over inter-session appointments even when the breaks have been fairly short, 
including when they have been less than ten days.44 
 
 The length of the break has been an issue, however, for intra-session recess 
appointments.  Attorney General Daugherty addressed that issue in the 1921 opinion 
discussed above.  Although the recess in question there was almost a month long and thus 
seemed long enough, Daugherty thought it important to address the required length of the 
break “so as to avoid any misconception as to the scope of this opinion.”45  “If the 
President is empowered to make recess appointments during the present adjournment,” he 
asked, “does it not necessarily follow that the power exists if an adjournment for only 2 
instead of 28 days is taken?”46  Daugherty “unhesitatingly answer[ed] this by saying 
no.”47  He also disputed that “an adjournment for 5 or even 10 days can be said to 
constitute the recess intended by the Constitution.”48  Beyond that, Daugherty doubted 
that one could specify a precise “line of demarcation,” and he suggested that the 
President “is necessarily vested with a large, although not unlimited, discretion to 
determine when there is a real and genuine recess making it impossible for him to receive 
the advice and consent of the Senate.”49 
 
Subsequent executive branch legal opinions considered the minimum length of 
time that was needed before an intra-session break would trigger the President’s recess 
appointments authority.  In 1992, for example, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) concluded that “[p]ast practice is consistent with exercise of the recess 
appointment power during an intrasession recess of eighteen days.”50  In 2004, it advised 
the Counsel to the President that the recess appointments power could be exercised 
during an 11-day recess.51 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 For example, as the majority noted in Noel Canning, “President Truman also made a recess 
appointment to the Civil Aeronautics Board during a 3-day inter-session recess. . . .  President Taft made a 
few appointments during a 9-day recess following his inauguration, and President Lyndon Johnson made 
several appointments during an 8-day recess several weeks after assuming office.”  134 S Ct at 2567. 
45 Memorandum from Harry M. Daugherty, Executive Power—Recess Appointments, 33 Op Atty 
Gen 20, 24 (1921). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id at 25. 
49 Id. 
50 Memorandum Opinion for the Deputy Counsel to the President, Recess Appointments During an 
Intrasession Recess, 16 Op OLC 15, 16 (1992). 
51 Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Feb 20, 2004) (heavily 
redacted), at 2, online at http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/369213-redacted-goldsmith-olc-memo-
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Starting in 2007, when Democrats assumed control of the Senate, they began a 
practice of conducting pro forma sessions during intra-session recesses in an effort to 
block President George W. Bush from making recess appointments during those periods.  
The practice ended in 2008 but was revived by congressional Republicans during the 
Obama administration.52  Although the Republicans did not control the Senate, they did 
control the House of Representatives, and the House insisted on the pro forma sessions as 
a condition of the House’s constitutionally required consent to Senate adjournments of 
longer than three days.53 
 
Shortly after President Obama made the appointments at issue in Noel Canning, 
OLC issued an opinion concluding that the appointments were valid.  OLC took the 
position that “while Congress can prevent the President from making any recess 
appointments by remaining continuously in session and available to receive and act on 
nominations, it cannot do so by conducting pro forma sessions during a recess.”54  OLC 
reasoned that the purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause is to allow the President to 
fill positions when the Senate is unavailable to consider nominations, and that this 
purpose is implicated even when a long Senate break is interrupted by pro forma 
sessions, because as a practical matter the Senate is not available to give its advice and 
consent during such a period. 
 
B.  Treatment of Historical Practice in Noel Canning 
 
On December 17, 2011, the Senate adjourned, subject to an order adopted by 
unanimous consent providing that it would reconvene “for pro forma sessions only, with 
no business conducted,” on four dates between December 17 and the end of the 
congressional session on January 3, 2012.55  The order further provided that when the 
new congressional session began on January 3, the Senate would reconvene “for pro 
forma sessions only, with no business conducted,” on five dates between January 6 and 
January 20.  Although the order stated that no business would be conducted during the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
recess-appointments.html.  Without deciding the issue, the memorandum also observes that “[a]rguably, the 
three days set by the Constitution as the time during which one House may adjourn without the consent of 
the other, US Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 4, is also the length of time amounting to a ‘Recess’ under the Recess 
Appointments Clause.”  Id at 3.   
52 See Jennifer Steinhauer, Sometimes a Day in Congress Takes Seconds, Gavel to Gavel, N.Y. 
Times (Aug 6, 2011), at A12. 
53 See US Const art I, § 5, cl 4 (“Neither house, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the 
Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two 
Houses shall be sitting.”). 
54 Memorandum Opinion for the Counsel to the President, Lawfulness of Recess Appointments 
During a Recess of the Senate Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma Sessions 4 (Jan 6, 2012), online at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2012/01/31/pro-forma-sessions-opinion.pdf. 
55 157 Cong Rec S8783 (daily ed Dec 17, 2011). 
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pro forma sessions, it was still possible for the Senate to act in those sessions through 
unanimous consent, and some minor business was conducted during this period.56 
 
On January 4, 2012, during a three-day gap between pro forma sessions, President 
Obama announced that he was using his recess appointments authority to fill three of the 
five positions on the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).57  The Noel Canning 
Corporation, a Pepsi-Cola distributor, subsequently challenged a decision of the NLRB 
finding that it had committed an unfair labor practice, arguing that the Board had lacked a 
quorum because the President had exceeded his authority in making the appointments.  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed, ruling broadly that the President’s 
recess appointments power applies only during inter-session recesses, and only to 
positions that become vacant during the recess.58   
 
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, but it was sharply divided on the 
rationale.  In large part based on historical practice, the five-Justice majority (consisting 
of Justice Breyer writing also for Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan) 
concluded that the President had the authority to make appointments during intra-session 
recesses and to fill vacancies that predated the recess, but that there was an insufficiently 
long recess in this case because of the pro forma sessions.  Justice Scalia, writing for 
himself, the Chief Justice, and Justices Thomas and Alito, concurred only in the 
judgment. 
 
1.  “The Recess” 
 
 The majority reasoned that the phrase “the Recess” was ambiguous.  Based on 
Founding-era dictionaries, the majority noted, the phrase might refer only to the recess 
between sessions of the Senate, or it might refer to any break of substantial length, 
regardless of whether it is during a session or between sessions.  Because the text is 
ambiguous, the majority reasoned, it was appropriate to consider the purpose of the 
Clause.  This purpose, according to the majority, is to “ensure the continued functioning 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 On December 23, 2011, the Senate agreed, by unanimous consent, to a process for passing the 
Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011.  See Sen. Harry Reid, “Unanimous Consent 
Agreement” Remarks in the Senate, 157 Cong Rec S8789 (daily ed Dec 23, 2011). 
57  See Press Release, President Obama Announces Recess Appointments to Four Key 
Administration Posts (Jan 4, 2012), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2012/01/04/president-obama-announces-recess-appointments-key-administration-posts.  The same 
day, President Obama invoked his recess appointments authority to fill the position of Director of the new 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.  
58 See Noel Canning v NLRB, 705 F3d 490 (DC Cir 2103).  The Third and Fourth Circuits 
subsequently agreed that the recess appointments power was limited to inter-session recesses, see NLRB v 
New Vista Nursing & Rehabilitation, 719 F3d 203 (3d Cir 2013), and NLRB v Enterprise Leasing Co. 
Southwest, LLC, 722 F3d 609 (4th Cir 2013).  These three decisions conflicted with a 2004 decision from 
the Eleventh Circuit, Evans v Stephens, 387 F3d 1220, 1224-26 (11th Cir 2004) (en banc), a case that 
involved an intra-session recess appointment of a federal judge.  Several circuits also had concluded, unlike 
the DC Circuit in Noel Canning, that the President’s recess appointments authority extended to vacancies 
that pre-existed the recess.  See Evans, 387 F3d at 1226-27; United States v Woodley, 751 F2d 1008, 1012-
13 (9th Cir 1985); United States v Alloco, 305 F2d 704, 712-13 (2d Cir 1962). 
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of the Federal Government when the Senate is away,”59 a purpose that the majority 
thought is served by applying the Clause to lengthy intra-session recesses.  “The Senate is 
equally away during both an inter-session and an intra-session recess,” the majority 
observed, “and its capacity to participate in the appointments process has nothing to do 
with the words it uses to signal its departure.”60 
 
 In support of that conclusion, the majority placed significant weight on historical 
practice.  The majority acknowledged that there was not much supportive practice in the 
period before the Civil War, but it said that this was so because Congress did not take 
significant intra-session breaks during that era.  It pointed to the intra-session 
appointments made by President Johnson in the 1860s as well as appointments made in 
1921 and 1929.  In addition, it observed that “[s]ince 1929, and particularly since the end 
of World War II, Congress has shortened its inter-session breaks as it has taken longer 
and more frequent intra-session breaks” and that “Presidents have correspondingly made 
more intra-session recess appointments.”61   
 
The majority also emphasized the repeated view of presidential legal advisers 
since Daugherty’s opinion in 1921 that intra-session recess appointments were valid.  
While the majority acknowledged that individual senators had sometimes taken a 
contrary view, it noted that “neither the Senate considered as a body nor its committees, 
despite opportunities to express opposition to the practice of intra-session recess 
appointments, has done so.”62  The majority recognized that “the Senate cannot easily 
register opposition as a body to every governmental action that many, perhaps most, 
Senators oppose.”63  But it noted that the Senate had at various times been actively 
engaged with the issue of recess appointments and that, in those situations, it had tended 
to adopt a functional approach to the nature of a “recess” without questioning the 
authority of the President to make intra-session recess appointments. 
 
Justice Scalia responded by emphasizing the lack of intra-session appointments 
early in history and the scarcity of such appointments before the 1920s.  He also 
emphasized the change of position by presidential legal advisers, from the Knox opinion 
to the Daugherty opinion.  He observed that “[n]o Presidential legal adviser approved 
th[e] practice [of intra-session recess appointments] before 1921, and subsequent 
approvals have rested more on precedent than on independent examination.”64  Justice 
Scalia further noted that individual senators at various times have disputed the claim.   
 
Turning from historical practice to the purpose of the Recess Appointments 
Clause, Justice Scalia disputed the majority’s argument that its purpose favored the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 134 S Ct at 2561. 
60 Id. 
61 Id at 2562. 
62 Id at 2563. 
63 Id at 2564. 
64 Id at 2604. 
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broader reading of the phrase “the Recess.”  In his view, the majority “disregards another 
self-evident purpose of the Clause:  to preserve the Senate’s role in the appointment 
process.”65  He also pointed out that changes in travel and communications mean that it is 
now much easier than it was historically for the Senate to reassemble in order to consider 
nominations—a change, he suggested, that renders the recess appointments power an 
anachronism.66 
 
2.  “Vacancies that May Happen During the Recess” 
 
 The majority concluded that the phrase “vacancies that may happen” in the 
Recess Appointments Clause also is ambiguous.  It acknowledged that the word 
“happen” in the phrase most naturally seems to refer to vacancies that occur during a 
recess.  But it insisted that this was “not the only possible way to use the word.”67  
Rather, the majority reasoned, the word can be read more broadly to refer vacancies that 
exist during a recess, and such a broader reading would be more consistent with the 
purpose of the Clause, which the majority thought was “to permit the President to obtain 
the assistance of subordinate officers when the Senate, due to its recess, cannot confirm 
them.”68 
 
 In addition, the majority again emphasized longstanding historical practice, this 
time with a lineage dating back much closer to the constitutional Founding.  From as 
early as the Madison administration, the majority noted, presidents have used the recess 
appointments power for vacancies that occurred prior to the recess, and executive branch 
legal advisors since the Monroe administration have advised presidents that they have 
such authority.  Although conceding that the precise numbers of such appointees are 
unknown, the majority thought it apparent that a large proportion of recess appointments 
throughout American history have involved vacancies that predated the recess.  As for the 
Pay Act, the majority argued that it did not clearly reflect a congressional judgment that 
the president lacked constitutional authority to use the Recess Appointments Clause to fill 
pre-existing vacancies and that, in any event, Congress’s amendment of the Act in 1940 
showed that the Senate had “in effect supported the President’s interpretation of the 
Clause.”69 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Id at 2597. 
66 See id at 2598.  During oral argument, Justice Kagan asked the Solicitor General whether the 
Recess Appointments Clause was “essentially an historic relic, something whose original purpose has 
disappeared and has assumed a new purpose that nobody ever intended it to have.”  Transcript of Oral 
Argument, NLRB v Noel Canning, No 12-1281, at 19 (Jan 13, 2014), online at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-1281_3d9g.pdf.  The Solicitor 
General responded by suggesting that, although not its original purpose, the Recess Appointments Clause 
might operate today as a “safety valve” to address political intransigence in the Senate in the appointments 
process.  See id at 20. 
67 134 S Ct at 2567.  See also id at 2573 (noting that there was “some linguistic ambiguity”). 
68 Id at 2568. 
69 Id at 2573. 
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 Justice Scalia responded by noting that appointments for pre-recess vacancies did 
not become common until the mid-nineteenth century, and only after much uncertainty 
and inconsistency of position within the executive branch on the issue.  He also 
contended that the Senate Judiciary Committee’s report in 1863, as well as Congress’s 
enactment of the Pay Act, showed that the Senate did not acquiesce in the executive 
branch’s claim about the meaning of the word “happen.”  As for the amendment of the 
Pay Act in 1940, Justice Scalia argued that it simply reflected Congress’s desire not to 
punish appointees caught in the dispute between the branches over the scope of the recess 
appointments power, not an acquiescence in the President’s constitutional claim. 
 
 The majority and Justice Scalia had differing views about the consequences of 
reading the Clause to be limited to vacancies occurring during a recess.  The majority 
thought, like Attorney General Wirt, that it was problematic to interpret the Clause in a 
way that “would prevent the President from making any recess appointment that arose 
before a recess, no matter who the official, no matter how dire the need, no matter how 
uncontroversial the appointment, and no matter how late in the session the office fell 
vacant.”70  Justice Scalia responded that Congress has allowed “acting” officers to carry 
out the duties associated with vacant offices, and that the President has the power to call 
Congress into special session to consider a nomination.  As for the majority’s view that 
those mechanisms were “inadequate expedients,” Justice Scalia argued that inefficiency 
associated with separation of powers “is not a bug to be fixed by this Court, but a 
calculated feature of the constitutional framework.”71   
 
For his part, Justice Scalia expressed the concern that the majority’s interpretation 
of the Clause might allow the President to evade the Constitution’s advice and consent 
requirement for appointments.  “On the majority’s reading,” Justice Scalia said, “the 
President would have had no need ever to seek the Senate’s advice and consent for his 
appointments: Whenever there was a fair prospect of the Senate’s rejecting his preferred 
nominee, the President could have appointed that individual unilaterally during the 
recess, allowed the appointment to expire at the end of the next session, renewed the 
appointment the following day, and so on ad infinitum.”72  The majority acknowledged 
this concern but noted that Congress had tools for responding to abuses, such as staying 
in session or enacting laws like the Pay Act.  It also noted that “the Executive Branch has 
adhered to the broader interpretation for two centuries, and Senate confirmation has 
always remained the norm for officers that require it.”73 
 
 3.  Duration of the Senate Break 
 
 Turning to whether the recess in this case was long enough, the majority reasoned 
that, “for purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause, the Senate is in session when it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Id at 2569-70. 
71 Id at 2610. 
72 Id at 2607. 
73 Id at 2569. 
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says it is, provided that, under its own rules, it retains the capacity to transact Senate 
business.”74  The majority made clear that this deference to the Senate “cannot be 
absolute,” and thus that if “the Senate is without the capacity to act, under its own rules, 
it is not in session even if it so declares.”75  But the majority reasoned that the Senate did 
have such capacity here, because under Senate rules it could have conducted (and, in fact, 
did conduct) business by passing a unanimous consent agreement.  As a result, the 
majority concluded that the appointments in this case were made during what amounted 
to a three-day recess between the pro forma sessions.76 
 
 The majority also held that in order to constitute a sufficient recess for purposes 
of the Recess Appointments Clause, the Senate break must in all cases be more than three 
days in length and presumptively must be at least ten days in length.77  Based on the fact 
that the Constitution does not require a chamber of Congress to obtain the consent of the 
other to adjourn unless the break is for more than three days, the majority reasoned that a 
break of three days or less is de minimis and thus insufficient to trigger the President’s 
recess appointments authority.  The majority also noted that it had not found a single 
instance in which an intra-session recess appointment had been made during a break of 
less than ten days.  “The lack of examples,” the majority inferred, “suggests that the 
recess-appointment power is not needed in that context.”78 
 
 Justice Scalia objected that the majority’s three- and ten-day limitations lacked 
support in the constitutional text.  He also complained that the majority had failed to 
establish any clear standard for when a break of longer than three days will be too short 
to qualify as a recess, and had failed to make clear whether there will ever be 
circumstances in which a break of more than ten days will not be long enough.  Justice 
Scalia argued more generally that the majority had engaged in “judicial fabrication of 
vague, unadministrable limits on the recess-appointment power . . . that overstep the 
judicial role.”79 
 
II.  Historical Gloss and Constitutional Theory  
 
 Noel Canning revealed methodological agreements and disagreements between 
the majority and Justice Scalia.  This Part begins by briefly noting them, and then 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Id at 2574. 
75 Id at 2575. 
76 During the oral argument, Justice Kagan suggested how a reliance on historical practice would 
lead to this result, explaining to the Solicitor General that “if you are going to rely on history and on the 
development of an equilibrium . . . then it seems to me that you also have to look to history and the 
development of an equilibrium with respect to Congress’s definition of its own power to determine whether 
it is in recess or not.”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 25-26 (cited in note 66).  
77 The majority deemed the presumption rebuttable in emergencies.  See 134 S Ct at 2567. 
78 Id at 2566.  The majority acknowledged that there had been a few instances of recess 
appointments made during inter-session recesses of fewer than ten days, but it said that it regarded “these 
few scattered examples as anomalies.”  Id at 2567. 
79 Id at 2595. 
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describes the “historical gloss” approach to discerning the separation of powers.  Finally, 
it identifies some ways in which the historical gloss approach overlaps with various non-
originalist theories of constitutional interpretation, such as Burkeanism and common law 
constitutionalism, as well as with variants of originalism that emphasize the distinction 
between interpretation and construction. 
 
A.  Methodological Disputes in Noel Canning 
  
The Noel Canning majority maintained that the Court should give “significant 
weight” to historical practice when resolving issues concerning “the allocation of power 
between two elected branches of the government.”80  Justice Scalia did not deny that 
historical practice might be relevant to some separation of powers issues, but he argued 
that this is true only when the constitutional text is ambiguous, and the Recess 
Appointments Clause, he said, was clear.  The majority accepted Justice Scalia’s premise 
but insisted that the text was ambiguous.81   
 
 The majority and Justice Scalia also disagreed about the conditions under which 
historical practice should be considered to help resolve the meaning of ambiguous text.  
Justice Scalia would consult historical practice only when it has been “open, widespread, 
and unchallenged since the early days of the Republic.”82  The majority, by contrast, read 
the precedents as “show[ing] that the Court has treated practice as an important 
interpretive factor even when the nature or longevity of that practice is subject to dispute, 
and even when that practice began after the founding era.”83  The majority emphasized 
that, regardless of how one reads the nineteenth century practice, the modern practice 
supported its conclusions.84 
 
 Justice Scalia criticized the majority’s approach to historical practice on several 
related grounds.  First, he suggested that it involved an abdication of judicial 
responsibility.  In cases that are justiciable, Justice Scalia wrote, the judiciary has a duty 
to determine the meaning of the Constitution’s structural provisions, so it should not 
defer to the resolutions of those questions by other branches.85  Second, he contended that 
the majority’s approach amounted to an “adverse-possession theory of executive power,” 
whereby the President could gain constitutional authority simply by acting in a certain 
way without sufficient congressional opposition.86  Such an approach, Justice Scalia 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Id at 2559. 
81 See id at 2561, 2568, 2577. 
82 Id at 2594. 
83 Id at 2560. 
84 See id at 2564 (“[T]here-quarters of a century of settled practice [of intra-session recess 
appointments] is long enough to entitle a practice to ‘great weight in a proper interpretation’ of the 
constitutional provision.”), quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 US at 689; id at 2573 (“The Senate as a 
body has not contested this practice [of filling pre-existing vacancies] for nearly three-quarters of a century, 
perhaps longer.”). 
85 See id at 2593. 
86 Id at 2617; see also id at 2592. 
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contended, “will systematically favor the expansion of executive power at the expense of 
Congress.”87  Finally, Justice Scalia argued that even if the Senate had acquiesced in the 
historical practice, it lacks the constitutional authority to give away its institutional 
power.  Structural constitutional provisions, he argued, exist in large part to protect 
individual liberty.  As a result, Justice Scalia said, “the Senate could not give away [the 
limitations in the Recess Appointments Clause] even if it wanted to.”88 
 
 In support of those arguments, Justice Scalia emphasized the Court’s 1983 
decision in INS v. Chadha.89  In Chadha, the Court held that a “legislative veto” 
provision violated the bicameralism and presentment provisions of Article I, Section 7, of 
the Constitution even though Congress had enacted hundreds of similar provisions since 
the 1930s.  According to the Court in Chadha, “the fact that a given law or procedure is 
efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, 
will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.”90  Moreover, in rejecting the 
application of the political question doctrine in that case, the Court observed that “[n]o 
policy underlying the political question doctrine suggests that Congress or the Executive, 
or both acting in concert and in compliance with Art. I, can decide the constitutionality of 
a statute; that is a decision for the courts.”91  Relatedly, the Court emphasized that the 
mere fact of an agreement by Congress and the President to enact legislative veto 
provisions did not immunize them from judicial review.92 
 
 The majority in Noel Canning responded to those points primarily by suggesting 
that, at this late date, the judiciary should accord deference to longstanding arrangements 
worked out by the coordinate branches of government:  “We have not previously 
interpreted the [Recess Appointments] Clause, and when doing so for the first time in 
more than 200 years, we must hesitate to upset the compromises and working 
arrangements that the elected branches of Government themselves have reached.”93  The 
majority also expressed concern about disturbing expectation interests surrounding the 
practice.  With respect to the filling of pre-existing vacancies, for example, the majority 
said that it was “reluctant to upset this traditional practice where doing so would seriously 
shrink the authority that Presidents have believed existed and have exercised for so 
long.”94   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Id at 2605. 
88 Id.; see also id at 2594 (“[T]he political branches cannot by agreement alter the constitutional 
structure.”). 
89 462 US 919 (1983). 
90 Id at 944. 
91 Id at 941-42.  For similar reasoning about the political question doctrine, see Zivotofsky v 
Clinton, 132 S Ct 1421, 1427-28 (2012). 
92 462 US at 942 n 13.  The Court also observed, however, that “11 Presidents, from Mr. Wilson 
through Mr. Reagan, who have been presented with this issue have gone on record at some point to 
challenge congressional vetoes as unconstitutional.”  Id. 
93 134 S Ct at 2560. 
94 Id at 2573. 
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Those methodological disagreements between the majority and Justice Scalia in 
Noel Canning invite an examination of how reliance on historic governmental practices 
relates to various non-originalist and originalist approaches to constitutional 
interpretation.  We begin with a description of the “historical gloss” approach. 
 
B.  The Historical Gloss Approach  
 
 Invocations of historic governmental practices are common in debates and 
decisions concerning the constitutional separation of powers.95  Giving weight to such 
practices is sometimes referred to as the “historical gloss” approach to constitutional 
interpretation, following Justice Frankfurter’s oft-quoted statement in the Youngstown 
steel seizure decision that “a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to 
the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents 
who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of 
power part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive 
Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”96  There are differing accounts of when 
such gloss should be credited and some of them do not precisely track Justice 
Frankfurter’s articulation, especially his reference to practice “never before questioned.”   
 
 There are additional issues that must be confronted in determining the contours of 
the historical gloss approach.  Those issues include what kind of history counts, how 
unequivocal the history must be in order to count, what the relationship of that history is 
to the constitutional text, and whether the gloss approach is limited to separation of 
powers questions or instead applies more broadly.  One of us has previously explored 
some of those issues,97 and we will offer additional thoughts about how best to conceive 
of the historical gloss approach in responding to Justice Scalia’s “adverse possession” 
complaint in Part V.  For now, it suffices to note the basic idea of historical gloss, which 
is that longstanding practices by one political branch that are acquiesced in by the other 
political branch should be given weight in discerning whether governmental conduct is 
consistent with the separation of powers.98 
 
 The Supreme Court has long invoked historical gloss in construing the 
constitutional authority of both Congress and the President.  An early example is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 
126 Harv L Rev 411, 417-24 (2012). 
96 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v Sawyer, 343 US 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J. 
concurring).  See also id at 610 (“It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to 
confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them.”). 
97 See Bradley & Morrison, Historical Gloss (cited in note 95).  
98 Although not the focus of this Article, historical gloss is also likely relevant to discerning the 
judicial power.  See, for example, Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and 
the Role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78 Ind LJ 153, 157 (2003) 
(“To understand judicial independence and its limits, then, we must look beyond ‘doctrinal’ independence 
as divined by courts, and examine the historical development of ‘customary’ independence as it has 
emerged in Congress.”). 
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McCulloch v. Maryland.99  In affirming Congress’s authority to establish a national bank, 
Chief Justice Marshall invoked historical practice near the outset of his opinion:  
 
[A] doubtful question, one on which human reason may pause and the 
human judgment be suspended, in the decision of which the great 
principles of liberty are not concerned, but the respective powers of those 
who are equally the representatives of the people, are to be adjusted; if not 
put at rest by the practice of the Government, ought to receive a 
considerable impression from that practice.100 
 
Marshall also explained that, in interpreting “a Constitution intended to endure for ages to 
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs,”101 great 
weight should be given to “[a]n exposition of the Constitution, deliberately established by 
legislative acts, on the faith of which an immense property has been advanced.”102    
 
 Given when McCulloch was decided, the historical practice to which Marshall 
referred necessarily dated from the early post-Founding period.  When the Court has had 
more history with which to work, it has not always insisted on such lineage.  In The 
Pocket Veto Case,103 for example, the Court considered whether a law presented by 
Congress to the President less than ten days before an inter-session recess becomes a law 
if it is neither signed nor returned by the President.  Article I, Section 7, of the 
Constitution provides that “[i]f any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten 
Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a 
Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment 
prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.”104  In concluding that an inter-
session recess qualifies as an adjournment and so prevents the return of a bill to Congress 
for purposes of this provision, the Court emphasized not only the constitutional text and 
structure, but also the historical practice concerning how presidents and Congresses had 
treated bills in that situation.  The Court observed that “[l]ong settled and established 
practice is a consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional 
provisions of this character.”105   The Court also quoted from a state court decision for the 
proposition that “a practice of at least twenty years’ duration ‘on the part of the executive 
department, acquiesced in by the legislative department, while not absolutely binding on 
the judicial department, is entitled to great regard in determining the true construction of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 17 US (Wheat) 316 (1819). 
100 Id at 401. 
101 Id at 415. 
102 Id at 401. 
103 279 US 655 (1929). 
104 US Const art I, § 7, cl 2. 
105 279 US at 689. 
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a constitutional provision the phraseology of which is in any respect of doubtful 
meaning.’”106  
 
Practice-based reasoning has been especially common in debates and decisions 
concerning foreign relations.107  In United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 
for example, the Supreme Court upheld a congressional delegation of authority to the 
President to criminalize arms sales to countries involved in a conflict in Latin America, 
based in part on the fact that Congress already had established a pattern of delegating 
broad authority to the President in the area of foreign affairs.108  The Court explained that 
“[a] legislative practice such as we have here, evidenced not only by occasional 
instances, but marked by the movement of a steady stream for a century and a half of 
time, goes a long way in the direction of proving the presence of unassailable ground for 
the constitutionality of the practice, to be found in the origin and history of the power 
involved, or in its nature, or in both combined.”109   
 
Similarly, in Dames & Moore v Regan, the Court invoked historical practice in 
upholding a presidential suspension of legal claims as part of the resolution of the Iranian 
hostage crisis.  The Court reasoned that, although Congress had not “directly 
authorize[d]” a presidential suspension of claims in that situation, the presidential action 
was supported by “inferences to be drawn from the character of the legislation Congress 
has enacted in the area,” as well as “the history of [congressional] acquiescence in 
executive claims settlement.”110  The Court explained that “[p]ast practice does not, by 
itself, create power, but ‘long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by 
Congress, would raise a presumption that the [action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its 
consent . . . .’”111  Finally, the Court made clear that even if the practice of executive 
claims settlement prior to 1952 should be disregarded because it occurred during a time 
when foreign sovereigns could not be sued in U.S. courts, “congressional acquiescence in 
settlement agreements since that time supports the President’s power to act here.”112 
 
Dames & Moore illustrates the connection between the historical gloss approach 
and Justice Jackson’s famous tripartite categorization of presidential power in 
Youngstown.  Under that categorization, the President’s power is at its highest when 
supported by express or implied congressional authorization, and is at its lowest when 
expressly or implicitly opposed by Congress.  When Congress has neither supported nor 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Id at 689-90, quoting State v South Norwalk, 77 Conn 257, 264, 58 A 759, 761 (1904).  The 
state case concerned the interpretation of a Connecticut constitutional provision providing that a bill would 
become law if the governor did not return it to the state legislature within three days of being presented 
with it. 
107 Bradley & Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 420-21 (cited in note 95). 
108 See 299 US 304 (1936).  
109 Id at 327-28. 
110 453 US 654, 678, 686 (1981).   
111 Id, quoting United States v Midwest Oil Co, 236 US 459, 474 (1915). 
112 Id at 684. 
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opposed presidential action, the President’s power is in an intermediate “zone of 
twilight.”113  That intermediate zone, Justice Jackson explained, is one in which the 
President and Congress “may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is 
uncertain.”114  Historical practice is especially pertinent in cases arising in that zone 
(although, as Dames & Moore illustrates, the pertinence of historical practice is not 
limited to the intermediate zone). 
 
 The Court, however, does not inevitably credit historic governmental practices.  
Probably the most famous example in which it did not do so is Chadha.  In Chadha, part 
of the Court’s disinclination to credit practice appears to have stemmed from its 
conviction that the text and structure of the Constitution were clear.  The Court stated, for 
example, that “[e]xplicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution prescribe and 
define the respective functions of the Congress and of the Executive in the legislative 
process.” 115   The Court also seemed to view claims about modern practice as 
methodologically inconsistent with its self-described originalist approach to interpretation 
in that case.  It wrote, for instance, that it was applying the “choices we discern as having 
been made in the Constitutional Convention,” 116  rather than by “Congress or the 
Executive, or both acting in concert.”117 
 
The significance of gloss is not limited to judicial reasoning.  In particular, this 
approach to constitutional interpretation is a staple of legal reasoning in the executive 
branch.  To take one relatively recent example, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) issued an opinion in 2011 concluding, based largely on historical 
practice, that President Obama had the constitutional authority to direct U.S. military 
forces to take part in bombing operations in Libya without first seeking congressional 
authorization.118  Quoting from an earlier legal opinion concerning a military intervention 
in Haiti, OLC asserted that “the pattern of executive conduct, made under claim of right, 
extended over many decades and engaged in by Presidents of both parties, evidences the 
existence of broad constitutional power.”119  
 
C.  Relationship to Other Interpretive Methodologies 
 
 There is overlap between the historical gloss approach and a variety of non-
originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation.  Reliance on historical practice fits 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 See Youngstown, 343 US at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).  
114 Id at 637. 
115 462 US at 945. 
116 Id at 959.  
117 Id at 942. 
118 See Memorandum Opinion from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen, 
Office of Legal Counsel, to the Att’y Gen., Authority to Use Military Force in Libya (Apr. 1, 2011), online 
at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2011/04/31/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf. 
119 Id at 7. 
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well with “Burkean” approaches, 120  which emphasize longstanding traditions and 
understandings, although most invocations of the gloss approach focus on the separation 
of powers rather than on other aspects of constitutional structure121 or on individual 
rights.122  Reliance on historical practice also fits well with non-judge-centered versions 
of “common law constitutionalism,” which involves an incremental interpretation of the 
Constitution in light of both judicial precedent and tradition.123  Like Burkeanism, this 
approach is deferential to the “accumulated wisdom of many generations” and to 
judgments that “have been tested over time, in a variety of circumstances, and have been 
found to be at least good enough.” 124   Both Burkeanism and common law 
constitutionalism, like the historical gloss approach, allow for the possibility that 
constitutional law can adapt to changing circumstances.125  A consideration of historical 
gloss is also consistent with more general “pluralist” theories of interpretation, which are 
open to a variety of kinds of constitutional authority.126 
 
 In addition, historical gloss arguments partially overlap with approaches to 
constitutional law that emphasize decisive moments in history, such as Bruce 
Ackerman’s account of constitutional “moments” and Eric Posner and Adrian 
Vermeule’s account of “constitutional showdowns.”127  Those accounts of constitutional 
law are similar to practice-based arguments in that both place special weight on the 
actions of the political branches.  Such approaches, however, tend to focus on critical 
turning points, whereas invocations of the historical gloss method tend to emphasize 
longer-term accretions of practice. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 For discussions of Burkean approaches to constitutional interpretation, see, for example, Cass 
R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 Mich L Rev 353 (2006), and Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 
Harv JL & Pub Pol’y 509 (1996). 
121 Notwithstanding the above quotation from McCulloch, there may be concerns with relying on 
historical practice to determine the expanse and limits of Congress’s enumerated powers, especially when 
reliance on state practice or on the lack of federal practice would thwart the ability of Congress to solve 
multi-state collective action problems that previously did not exist or previously went unaddressed for any 
number of reasons.  See Neil S. Siegel, Distinguishing the “Truly National” from the “Truly Local”: 
Customary Allocation, Commercial Activity, and Collective Action, 62 Duke LJ 797 (2012). 
122 Cf Sunstein, 105 Mich L Rev at 400 (cited in note 120) (“Under some constitutional provisions, 
above all the Equal Protection Clause, the Burkean [tradition-based] approach is hard or perhaps impossible 
to square with entrenched understandings in American constitutional law . . . .”). 
123 See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U Chi L Rev 877 (1996).  
124 Id at 892. 
125 See id at 905 (arguing that common law constitutionalism helps explain why “the most 
important changes to the Constitution—many of them, at least— . . . have come about either through 
changes in judicial decisions, or through deeper changes in politics or in society”); Ernest Young, 
Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 NC L Rev 
619, 664 (1994) (explaining that, under a Burkean approach, “institutions become effective in meeting the 
needs of society through a continuing process of adaptation that may or may not be consistent with the 
original intentions of the founders”). 
126 See, for example, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 100 Harv L Rev 1189 (1987). 
127 See Bruce Ackerman, 1 We the People:  Foundations 22 (Belknap, 1991); Eric A. Posner & 
Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U Pa L Rev 991 (2008). 
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 Similarly, the gloss approach is related to, but distinct from, the claim that some 
discrete non-judicial acts can come to be viewed as “precedent.”  Michael Gerhardt has 
developed the idea of non-judicial precedent,128 and Keith Whittington’s emphasis on 
“constitutional construction” (discussed below) includes discussion of various non-
judicial events that are asserted to qualify as precedent.129  The proposition that discrete 
non-judicial actions can have precedential effect is not the same as gloss’s focus on 
longstanding practices, but the ideas are complementary in that longstanding practices are 
likely to have their roots in particular precedents.  As is the case with gloss, moreover, 
there is nothing inherent in the idea of non-judicial precedent that would limit it to a 
particular period of U.S. history, or that would preclude it from being overtaken by later 
developments.130 
 
 Historical gloss also can be relevant to “functional” approaches to the separation 
of powers.  Functional approaches evaluate not whether governmental arrangements are 
consistent with certain categorical distinctions between different kinds of government 
power, but rather whether those arrangements are beneficial and consistent with the 
values underlying the system of separation of powers and checks and balances.131  
Longstanding historical practice may show that an arrangement is working well, or at 
least that it is not unduly problematic.  As Chadha illustrates, gloss might be harder to 
reconcile with “formal” approaches, which attempt to discern whether arrangements are 
consistent with the Constitution’s separation of authority into executive, legislative, and 
judicial categories.  That said, historical practice might shed light on what falls within the 
different categories—or on when to allow exceptions to the categorization.  For example, 
the Supreme Court’s formalist opinions concerning the permissibility of non-Article III 
tribunals allow for exceptions based on historical practice, and even self-identified 
originalist Justices like Justice Scalia have accepted those exceptions.132 
 
As Chadha also illustrates, it is more difficult to reconcile the historical gloss 
approach with many originalist theories of interpretation, particularly (but not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Power of Precedent ch 4 (Oxford, 2008). 
129 See Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction:  Divided Powers and Constitutional 
Meaning (Harvard, 1999). 
130 Some non-judicial precedents also may help to establish “constitutional conventions,” which 
involve norms about proper conduct by governmental actors but that do not necessarily entail 
understandings of what is constitutionally required or permissible.  For discussions of the idea of 
constitutional conventions, see Keith E. Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions 
in the United States, 2013 U Ill L Rev 1847, and Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 
113 Colum L Rev 1163, 1181-94 (2013).  
131 For a discussion of functional versus formal approaches to the separation of powers, see M. 
Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U Pa L Rev 603 (2001). 
 132 See Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 US 50 (1982) (plurality 
opinion); see also Stern v Marshall, 131 S Ct 2594, 2621 (2011) (Scalia, J, concurring) (“[A]n Article III 
judge is required in all federal adjudications, unless there is a firmly established historical practice to the 
contrary.” (second emphasis added)).   
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exclusively) those that were developed in the 1970s and 1980s.133  To be sure, some 
originalists are likely to credit early post-Founding practice as evidence of the 
Constitution’s original meaning, based on the idea that the governmental actors in that 
period had a particularly good sense of that meaning.134  But such a rationale would not 
justify looking to modern governmental practice, as, for example, the majority did in 
Noel Canning.135 
 
There are, however, certain variants of originalism that are potentially compatible 
with the consideration of historical practice for reasons other than as evidence of original 
meaning.  In particular, in recent years a number of theorists associated with the “new 
originalism” have distinguished between “constitutional interpretation” and 
“constitutional construction,”136 a distinction we discuss in greater detail in Part III.  It is 
not clear that those theorists all have precisely the same concepts in mind when they 
make that distinction.  In general, however, they aim to distinguish determinations that 
are closely linked to the constitutional text (which they call “interpretation”) from those 
that supplement the text (which they call “construction”). 
 
 Adding the idea of “construction” to the originalist’s tool kit closes the gap 
between originalist and non-originalist approaches, which may be why certain originalists 
resist it.137  Given the existence of “the construction zone,” the new originalism seems 
receptive to at least some historical gloss on the separation of powers.  While new 
originalists believe that the original semantic meaning of the constitutional text must be 
applied when that meaning is discernible regardless of historical practice, they also allow 
other legal materials to be brought to bear—presumably, including historical practice— 
when “interpretation” does not yield an answer.  Nothing about the distinction between 
interpretation and construction would appear to commit new originalists to rejecting 
longstanding historical practices as building materials for construction, and theorists like 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 For a discussion of first- and second-generation originalism, see Keith E. Whittington, 
Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 Fordham L Rev 375 (2013). 
134 See Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52 
UCLA L Rev 1487, 1498, 1537 (2005) (“Early interpretations evidence the original meaning of the 
Constitution because it is thought that early interpreters were likely to understand the meaning of the 
constitutional language and the context in which it was enacted.”).  
135 See Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Use of History, 82 Fordham L Rev 641, 657 
(2013) (“The practices of the Washington Administration immediately after adoption of the Constitution 
are generally thought relevant to understanding the original meaning of Article II.  But the practices of the 
Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower Administrations—which did far more to shape the actual presidency 
we have and the actual powers that contemporary presidents enjoy—are not relevant to the originalist 
model of authority.”). 
 136 See Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 Geo LJ 713, 714 (2011); 
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 Fordham L Rev 453, 467-69 (2013). 
 137 See, for example, John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good 
Constitution ch 8 (Harvard, 2013).  See also Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Non-
Originalism?, 62 Hastings LJ 707, 710 (2011) (“Given modern originalism’s origins as a response to the 
perceived excesses of non-originalism, it is not surprising that many originalists have resisted refinements 
to the theory that would tend to collapse the distinction between originalism and non-originalism.”). 
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Whittington are expressly receptive to that possibility.  Likewise, Balkin’s invocation of 
the full array of modalities of constitutional argument suggests that historical gloss is a 
legitimate part of constitutional construction,138 and his robust construction zone seems 
especially compatible with regular consideration of historical practice.139  Even versions 
of originalism that posit a smaller construction zone do not seem incompatible with the 
historical gloss approach so long as one is operating within the construction zone because 
original meaning has run out. 
 
III.  Madisonian Liquidation 
 
 A variant of originalism, known as “liquidation,” would allow initial post-
Founding practice to resolve ambiguities in the Constitution’s original meaning and 
thereby “fix” the meaning against subsequent change.  This idea is frequently ascribed to 
James Madison, based on statements he made in The Federalist Papers and in later 
writings.  Madison never presented a detailed explanation of the idea, and it has received 
only limited attention in the academic literature.  As a result, it is not entirely clear 
whether and to what extent it differs from the historical gloss approach.  Indeed, the 
majority in Noel Canning seemed to treat liquidation and gloss as the same 
phenomenon.140 
 
 Among the uncertainties with the liquidation concept are whether the settlement 
of constitutional meaning may occur only through early post-Founding practice, or 
whether it also may occur through later practice long after the Founding—and, if the 
latter, how likely it is that a settlement long after the Founding could take place.  It is also 
unclear whether, under the liquidation theory, an initial settlement through liquidation 
may be undone by a subsequent settlement through a new liquidation.  How one answers 
those questions will go a long way towards determining how much difference in practice 
there is between the liquidation approach and the historical gloss approach.   
 
 Judging from the limited extent to which the liquidation concept has been 
explored in the literature—most notably by Caleb Nelson—it appears to be narrower in 
various ways than the historical gloss approach.  Our best sense, which informs the 
following analysis, is that the liquidation concept turns on initial practice, which typically 
although not necessarily will be early practice, and that the liquidation may not be 
undone through subsequent liquidation.  These limitations, moreover, are what make 
liquidation potentially compatible with some versions of originalism.  Not surprisingly, 
therefore, it is Justice Scalia’s opinion in Noel Canning, not the majority’s, that seems 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 For a discussion of six “modalities” of constitutional argumentation that are common in U.S. 
constitutional decisions and debates, see generally Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate:  Theory of the 
Constitution ch 6 (Oxford, 1982), and Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation (Blackwell, 1993).  
 139 See, for example, Neil S. Siegel, Jack Balkin’s Rich Historicism and Diet Originalism: Health 
Benefits and Risks for the Constitutional System, 111 Mich L Rev 931, 952 (2013) (emphasizing the thin-
ness of Balkin’s version of originalism).   
 140 See 134 S. Ct. at 2580 (citing a variety of decisions, including some that have endorsed gloss, 
for the proposition that “our cases have continually confirmed Madison’s view”). 
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receptive to an understanding of liquidation that would be narrower than, and distinct 
from, gloss.  In this Part, we question whether this narrower conception is properly 
attributed to Madison, and we argue that it is in any event normatively unattractive as an 
alternative to gloss. 
 
A.  The “Liquidation” Theory 
 
Instead of looking to early practices as evidence of original meaning, and instead 
of embracing the idea of constitutional construction, some originalist scholars attribute to 
the Founders the recognition that the constitutional text did not settle certain questions of 
constitutional meaning and that the answers to those questions would need to be worked 
out, or “liquidated,” through decisions and practices.141  Once liquidated, the argument 
goes, the meaning of the Constitution on those questions would become “fixed” and so 
not subject to change.  This idea of liquidation through initial practice is most frequently 
associated with a statement made by James Madison in Federalist No. 37.  “All new 
laws,” he wrote in that essay, “though penned with the greatest technical skill and passed 
on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and 
equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular 
discussions and adjudications.”142  As this passage makes clear, Madison was not tying 
liquidation specifically to constitutional interpretation; he was simply observing that it 
was something that one should expect with all new laws (including statutory law and the 
common law).  Hamilton also made references to “liquidation” in The Federalist, 
similarly without suggesting that it was something specific to the Constitution.143  
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 See, for example, Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U Chi L Rev 
519, 525-53 (2003), and Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution’s Accommodation of Social Change, 88 
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Unwritten Constitution ch 8 (Basic, 2012).  Our colleague Stephen Sachs reads Amar’s argument as 
embracing the idea of liquidation through early practice.  See Stephen E. Sachs, The “Unwritten 
Constitution” and Unwritten Law, 2013 U Ill L Rev 1797, 1806-08.  In the next chapter of his book, 
however, Amar goes on to discuss how institutional practices of Congress, the Supreme Court, and 
administrative agencies, including practices long after the Founding, “gloss and clarify the text, inducing 
interpreters to read the otherwise indeterminate text in a highly determinate way.”  Amar at 335.  
142 The Federalist No. 37, at 229 (James Madison), in The Federalist Papers (cited in note 14).  
Madison also referred to the liquidation idea in later writings, albeit decades after the Founding.  See, for 
example, Letter to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 The Writings of James Madison 450 (G. Hunt ed, 
1908).  
143 Alexander Hamilton observed in Federalist No. 78 that, when two statutes conflict, “it is the 
province of the courts to liquidate and fix their meaning and operation.”  The Federalist No. 78, at 468 
(Alexander Hamilton), in The Federalist Papers (cited in note 14); see also Federalist No. 22, at 150 
(Hamilton), in The Federalist Papers (cited in note 14) (“Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound 
and define their true meaning and operation.”); Federalist No. 82, at 491 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 
Papers (cited in note 14) (“’Tis time only that can mature and perfect so compound a system, can liquidate 
the meaning of all the parts, and can adjust them to each other in a harmonious and consistent WHOLE.”). 
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Caleb Nelson has developed the most detailed account of the liquidation concept.  
Nelson argues that, when Founders such as Madison referred to the possibility that post-
Founding practice would “fix” constitutional meaning, they were using that term in a 
manner similar to those who, like the famous satirist Jonathan Swift, had advocated 
“fixing” the English language so that its meaning would not change over time.144  The 
possibility of preventing change in the meaning of language was controversial, and 
Nelson notes that many Americans of the Founding generation probably assumed that 
change in language was inevitable.  But Nelson observes that “[w]hatever their position 
on this issue, though, Americans certainly were familiar with the idea of ‘fixing’ the 
language, and they associated this concept with permanence and immutability.”145  
Madison’s references to “fixing” the meaning of the Constitution, Nelson contends, must 
be understood in that context:  “[a]lthough Madison conceded that the words used in the 
Constitution might well fall out of favor or acquire new shades of meaning in later usage, 
he was suggesting that their meaning in the Constitution would not change; once that 
meaning was ‘fixed,’ it should endure.”146  
 
 Under that account, the Founders were delegating to governmental actors, and to 
the courts, the task of resolving ambiguities in the original meaning of the Constitution.  
As Nelson explains, regardless of whether the Founders viewed the liquidation process as 
part of the original meaning of the Constitution (thus binding originalists today) or 
something associated with the background “general” law in existence at the time (thus 
not binding originalists today), the basic idea of liquidation remained the same: 
“reasonable members of the founding generation . . . might conceivably have read each 
indeterminate provision in the Constitution not only to define a range of permissible 
interpretations, but also to delegate power to the provision’s initial interpreters to make 
an authoritative selection within that range.”147 
 
It is easy to see why the liquidation account would be attractive to some 
originalists.  For one thing, it tells interpreters where to look for evidence of 
constitutional meaning when ambiguities in the text render it impossible to discern the 
original meaning—typically, in early post-Founding deliberations or decisions.  For 
another thing, by “fixing” the meaning, the account avoids the possibility that 
constitutional meaning might change over time.  Upon close examination, however, it is 
not clear that either of the two elements of the approach—looking only to initial practice 
and decisions, and disallowing a subsequent interpretation that contradicts the one 
reflected in initial practice—follows from Madison’s statements.  In any event, a showing 
that Madison or other Founders had this view would not establish that it should be 
followed (as Nelson is careful to acknowledge), and it is normatively problematic along a 
number of dimensions. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 See Nelson, 70 U Chi L Rev at 530-35 (cited in note 141). 
145 Id at 534-35. 
146 Id at 535 (emphasis added).   
147 Id at 551. 
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B.  Madison’s Views 
 
To understand what Madison was getting at in Federalist No. 37, it is necessary to 
put Madison’s reference to liquidation in context.  This Federalist Paper responds to 
criticisms about the proposed Constitution by emphasizing the extraordinary difficulties 
that the Framers had confronted in attempting to draft a new framework for government.  
Madison noted that federalism was a novel constitutional arrangement, so that the 
Framers had scant previous experience from which to draw.148  He added that the 
Convention faced great difficulties even in the area of separation of powers, where 
previous experience was more substantial.149  “Among the difficulties encountered by the 
convention,” Madison explained, “a very important one must have lain in combining the 
requisite stability and energy in government, with the inviolable attention due to liberty 
and to the republican form.”150  In emphasizing the challenging nature of those efforts, 
Madison pointed to the long experience of Great Britain in attempting to work out 
differences in categories of law and jurisdiction, a process that he noted was still 
ongoing.151  He then made the statement about liquidation.152   
 
 Liquidation was required, Madison wrote, for three reasons.  The first was “the 
obscurity arising from the complexity of objects” needing to be distinguished, including 
the distinction between federal and state power, and the lines separating the executive, 
legislative, and judicial authorities.  The second reason concerned “the imperfections of 
the human faculties,” which make it even more difficult to perceive those objects.  The 
third reason involved the limits of language, which Madison characterized as 
“inadequateness of the vehicle of ideas.”153  “Hence, it must happen,” Madison wrote, 
“that however accurately objects may be discriminated in themselves, and however 
accurately the discrimination may be considered, the definition of them may be rendered 
inaccurate by the inaccuracy of the terms in which it is delivered.”154  As Madison must 
have known, none of those justifications would ever disappear, even after what he 
referred to as “particular discussions and adjudications” took place in the early years of 
life under the new Constitution—or even many decades hence.155   
 
 It is also bears mention that Madison referred both to practice and to judicial 
decisions as involved in liquidation.156  It seems unlikely, however, that he was referring 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 The Federalist No. 37, at 226, in The Federalist (cited in note 14). 
149 Id at 228.  
150 Id at 226. 
151 Id. at 228. 
152 Id. at 228-29. 
153 Id at 229.  
154 Id.  
155 Id. 
156  See Peter J. Smith, The Marshall Court and the Originalist’s Dilemma, 90 Minn L Rev 612, 
634 (2006) (“That Madison believed that congressional deliberation or popular action could fix 
constitutional meaning does not mean that he rejected the notion that the courts could fix it in appropriate 
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only to initial judicial decisions, because it would not have been reasonable to expect 
all—or even most—issues of textual ambiguity to be resolved by the courts in the 
immediate aftermath of the Constitution’s ratification, or even over the Constitution’s 
first century.  Given the common law tradition that Madison referenced in Federalist No. 
37, it is also unlikely that Madison thought that a judicial decision would fix 
constitutional meaning in a way that would disallow subsequent reconsideration of the 
decision.  There are differing accounts of how strongly the Founders conceived of stare 
decisis, but none of those accounts suggests that they thought judicial decisions never 
could be revisited absent an Article V amendment.157 
 
For those reasons, Madison need not be read in Federalist No. 37 as suggesting 
either that initial practice would freeze the meaning of the Constitution going forward or 
that only such practice was relevant to constitutional interpretation.  Instead, as historian 
Jack Rakove notes, Madison can reasonably be understood as referring broadly to “the 
ongoing process of resolving ‘obscure and equivocal’ ambiguities through ‘particular 
discussions and adjudications’—in a word, interpretation.” 158   Such a process of 
interpretation logically would include frequent consideration of practice long after the 
Founding.  As Rakove points out, “only knowledge created by intervening developments 
could supply the ‘want of antecedent experience’ felt by the framers.”159 
 
 To be sure, Madison did tell his colleagues in the first Congress that their decision 
regarding the power of the President to remove executive branch officers unilaterally 
“will become the permanent exposition of the Constitution.”160  That statement, however, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
cases, as well.  Indeed, his discussion in The Federalist No. 37 and in other sources suggests that he saw 
both as viable means of liquidating the meaning of constitutional ambiguities.”).  The same can be said of 
Hamilton in Federalist No. 78, which specifically references the courts. 
157  See, for example, Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding 
Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 Vand L Rev 647 (1999); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, 
Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 Nw U L Rev 803, 809-23 (2009); Lee J. Strang, An 
Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 NM L 
Rev 419 (2006); see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum 
L Rev 723, 757 (1988) (“In the American common law, stare decisis states a conditional obligation: 
precedent binds absent a showing of substantial countervailing considerations.”). 
158 Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 159 
(Vintage, 1996) (emphasis in original).  See also H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of 
Original Intent, 98 Harv L Rev 885, 910 (1985) (“Madison’s argument, which Hamilton had anticipated in 
The Federalist No. 22, was of course a restatement in somewhat abstract terms, of the old common law 
assumption, shared by the Philadelphia framers, that the ‘intent’ of any legal document is the product of the 
interpretive process and not some fixed meaning that the author locks into the document’s text at the 
outset.”). 
159 Rakove at 159 (cited in note 158).  See also Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding 
of Original Intent?, 5 Const Comm 77, 110 (1998) (interpreting Madison to mean that “[e]arly and 
continued practice” would serve as “a check on (but not an invariable barrier to) subsequent 
reinterpretation”). 
160 1 Annals of Cong. 514 (1789).  For a description of different scholarly views about what, if 
anything, was actually agreed upon in this “Decision of 1789,” see Bradley & Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 
477 (cited in note 95). 
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could be read simply as a prediction of the probable precedential and path-dependent 
consequences of the decision.  Madison surely knew that whether Congress’s decision 
would in fact “become the permanent exposition of the Constitution” would depend on 
whether future interpreters would accept the decision as authoritative.  In that regard, it is 
noteworthy that Congress subsequently insisted on a greater role in the removal process, 
and, despite resisting some of those efforts in Myers v United States,161 the Supreme 
Court ultimately has allowed Congress the ability to limit presidential removal of a 
variety of officials.162 
 
 Another example commonly cited as evidence of Madison’s embrace of the 
liquidation idea is his shift in public position concerning the constitutionality of the 
national bank.  In December 1790, Alexander Hamilton submitted a plan for a national 
bank that would be chartered by Congress.  Madison, who had been elected to the first 
Congress from Virginia, opened the debate in the House by declaring the bank beyond 
the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers.163  By 1815, however, Madison was now 
President, and in vetoing on policy grounds a bill to reauthorize the bank, he “[w]aiv[ed] 
the question of the constitutional authority of the Legislature to establish an incorporated 
bank as being precluded in my judgment by repeated recognitions under varied 
circumstances of the validity of such an institution in acts of the legislative, executive, 
and judicial branches of the Government, accompanied by indications, in different 
modes, of a concurrence of the general will of the nation.”164  In that veto message, 
Madison did not appear to be saying that initial practice had fixed the meaning of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause for all time absent a formal amendment.  Instead, he 
seemed to be suggesting that, because the political branches and the general public had 
long agreed that the bank was constitutional, he no longer felt entitled to insist on his own 
view of the constitutional text and the original understanding in considering whether to 
sign the bill into law.  Such a view is consistent with historical gloss.165 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 272 US 52 (1926). 
162 See, for example, Humphrey’s Executor v United States, 295 US 602 (1935), and Morrison v 
Olson, 487 US 654 (1988). 
163 James Madison’s Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank (Feb. 2, 1791), in James 
Madison: Writings 480-490 (Library of America, Jack N. Rakove ed 1999). 
164  James Madison, Veto Message on the National Bank (Jan. 30, 1815), online at 
http://millercenter.org/president/madison/speeches/speech-3626.  See also Richard S. Arnold, How James 
Madison Interpreted the Constitution, 72 NYU L Rev 267, 286-90 (1997). 
165 Historian Drew McCoy views Madison’s change regarding the bank as an application of “one 
of his cardinal rules of interpretation,” which “was to respect the authority of ‘early, deliberate and 
continued practice under the Constitution.’”  Drew R. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and 
the Republican Legacy 80 (Cambridge, 1989), quoting Letter from James Madison to Martin L. Hurlbert 
(May 1830).  Notably, Madison’s principle required practice that was continued.  When the bank again 
became controversial during Madison’s retirement, McCoy notes, Madison proclaimed that declaring the 
bank unconstitutional in the 1830s would constitute “a defiance of all the obligations derived from a course 
of precedents amounting to the requisite evidence of the national judgment and intention.”  Id at 81, 
quoting Madison.  Such statements suggest that Madison was not insisting upon liquidation only by initial 
practice. 
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 Moreover, even if Madison had been suggesting that post-Founding practices and 
beliefs had fixed constitutional meaning in favor of the permissibility of the bank, it 
would not have been an example of liquidation as that concept has been described by 
scholars like Nelson.  The liquidation theory posits that certain issues of constitutional 
meaning were left unresolved at the Founding.  Madison, however, did not believe that 
the meaning of the Constitution was ambiguous with respect to the permissibility of the 
national bank.  On the contrary, he continued to believe that the text supported his 
previous view.166  But because too many other institutions and individuals had disagreed 
with him over an extended period of time, he “‘did not feel [him]self, as a public man, at 
liberty to sacrifice all these public considerations to [his] private opinion.’”167   
 
 The majority in Noel Canning seemed to interpret some of Madison’s statements 
on liquidation as consistent with the historical gloss approach.  In explaining the 
propriety of looking to practice, the majority quoted a letter from Madison referring to 
liquidation, and then said that “our cases have continually confirmed Madison’s view.”168  
Many of the decisions that the majority cited, however, endorsed historical gloss.169  
Indeed, the majority correctly described those precedents as “show[ing] that this Court 
has treated practice as an important interpretive factor even when the nature or longevity 
of that practice is subject to dispute, and even when that practice began after the founding 
era.”170  Thus, the majority—reasonably, we think—interpreted Madison’s reference to 
liquidation differently from how it has been interpreted by some originalist scholars. 
 
 To be sure, the majority never clearly committed to a potential feature of the 
historical gloss approach, which is the possibility that constitutional meaning might 
change over time.  It is precisely the possibility of change in meaning over time that leads 
many originalists, including those who subscribe to the liquidation idea, to reject gloss 
and to limit liquidation to the resolution of textual ambiguities.  Moreover, the majority 
emphasized the modern practice relating to recess appointments over the earlier practice, 
and it made clear that three-quarters of a century of practice is enough to merit substantial 
weight in interpreting the separation of powers.171  The majority insisted, however, that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166  See Powell, 98 Harv L Rev at 940 (cited in note 158) (“His own ‘abstract opinion of the text’ 
remained unchanged: the words of the Constitution did not authorize Congress to establish the bank.”), 
quoting Letter from James Madison to C.E. Haynes (Feb 25, 1831), reprinted in 4 Letters and Other 
Writings of James Madison 164, 165 (1865). 
167  Powell, 98 Harv L Rev at 940 (cited in note 158), quoting Letter from James Madison to 
Marquis de LaFayette (Nov 1826), reprinted in 3 Letters and Other Writings of James Madison 538, 542 
(1865). 
168 134 S Ct at 2560. 
 169 See 134 S Ct at 2560, citing Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361, 401 (1989); Dames & 
Moore v Regan, 453 US 654, 686 (1981); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer, 343 US 579, 610-611 
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 US 655, 689-90 (1929); Ex parte 
Grossman, 267 US 87, 118-19 (1925); United States v Midwest Oil Co., 236 US 459, 472-74 (1915); 
McPherson v Blacker, 146 US 1, 27 (1892); McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat) 316, 401 (1819); and 
Stuart v Laird, 5 US (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). 
 170 134 S Ct at 2560. 
171 Id at 2564, 2573. 
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the earlier practice did not establish a contrary understanding of the recess appointments 
power.  For the issue of intra-session recess appointments, for example, the majority 
described the pre-Civil War history as simply “not helpful” to resolving the question one 
way or the other, rather than as contradictory.172  For the issue of appointments to pre-
existing vacancies, the majority suggested that there simply were differing views about 
the issue prior to Attorney General Wirt’s 1823 opinion.173   
 
 The majority’s silence about the possibility of changes in constitutional meaning 
outside of the Article V amendment process is characteristic of the Court’s other 
decisions that have endorsed historical gloss.  It is also consistent with the Court’s 
constitutional law decisions more generally, even in areas in which it might seem obvious 
that constitutional meaning has shifted, such as with respect to certain individual rights.  
The Court’s silence likely reflects anxieties about the counter-majoritarian difficulty, 
especially in areas in which there is significant public debate.174  Despite the Court’s 
reluctance to acknowledge it openly, there is nothing inherent in the logic of the historical 
gloss approach that would disallow a constitutional interpreter from crediting a shift in 
practice over time. 
 
C.  Problems with the Liquidation Concept 
 
 Even if it could be shown that Madison did have in mind an approach whereby 
ambiguities in original meaning could be settled by, and only by, initial practice, and 
even if it could further be shown that some (or many or most) other Founders shared 
Madison’s view, those demonstrations would not themselves establish that constitutional 
interpreters today should accept such an approach.  As careful originalists acknowledge, 
originalism cannot establish its own validity.175  A normative defense of the liquidation 
approach would need to address substantial objections.  
 
The theory behind the liquidation idea, to reiterate, is that the Founders delegated 
the settlement of ambiguities in constitutional meaning to subsequent governmental 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Id at 2562. 
173 See id at 2570. 
 174 Justice Scalia sometimes exploits those anxieties.  See, for example, Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 38 ll.3-8, Hollingsworth v Perry, 133 S Ct 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144) (“I’m curious, when . . . 
did it become unconstitutional to exclude homosexual couples from marriage? 1791? 1868, when the 
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted?  [S]ome time after Baker [v Nelson, 409 US 810 (1972)], where we 
said it didn’t even raise a substantial Federal question? When . . . did the law become this?”). 
175 See, for example, Nelson, 70 U Chi L Rev at 547-48 (cited in note 141).  Modern variants of 
originalism, unlike the first generation of originalist scholarship, focus on the original meaning of the 
Constitution rather than on original intent.  See, for example, Whittington, 82 Fordham L Rev (cited in note 
133).  That shift in focus further complicates any claim that a liquidation approach to the Constitution 
should be followed because Founders such as James Madison intended it.  To be sure, considerations of 
intent and meaning may not be neatly separable, so it might be argued (for example) that liquidation was 
part of the background understandings about how the Constitution would operate and thus was part of its 
original meaning.  See Sachs, 2013 U Ill L Rev at 1807 (cited in note 141).  Again, however, even if that 
could be shown, it would not establish that liquidation should be followed.  Some justification external to 
originalism would be needed. 
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actors.176  It is unclear, however, why it would have made sense for the Founders to 
decide that constitutional meaning should be determined dispositively by the particular 
political alignment that happened to exist whenever the issue first arose.  In attempting to 
determine constitutional meaning, the initial generations presumably would be no less 
self-serving and potentially short-sighted than later generations, and they would have 
much less experience in apprehending the needs of American governance.  Moreover, 
those initial generations obviously would lack knowledge of subsequent changes in 
conditions and values that could dramatically affect the implications of adopting one 
interpretation of the Constitution instead of another.  Notwithstanding those substantial 
limitations, the liquidation approach would license earlier generations to bind more 
experienced successors through simple majoritarian politics. 
 
Those objections are not overcome by positing that liquidation should be limited 
to situations in which the earlier generations deliberated with unusual seriousness.177  
Even if one could identify a way to solve the practical problem of distinguishing different 
levels of congressional or executive branch seriousness, the more fundamental problem 
would remain that subsequent generations might deliberate at least as seriously and they 
would necessarily possess substantially more knowledge and experience.  The net effect 
of widespread acceptance of the liquidation idea would be a regime that possesses many 
of the “dead hand” disadvantages of originalism, but few of the asserted upsides of 
originalism beyond limiting interpretive discretion—namely, preventing constitutional 
change outside the demanding supermajoritarian process of Article V, and conferring 
democratic legitimacy upon the institution of judicial review by limiting it to enforcement 
of the original supermajoritarian act of higher lawmaking.178 
 
 Another problem with originalist efforts to distinguish between liquidation and 
historical gloss is that such a distinction is in tension with the acceptance by many 
originalists of judicial precedent.  Justice Scalia, for example, has made clear that he 
accepts the presumptively binding force of precedent in a number of areas of 
constitutional law.179  Justice Scalia describes his approach to precedent as a pragmatic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 See Nelson, 70 U Chi L Rev at 551 (cited in note 141). 
177 See id at 528. 
 178 One common justification for Chevron deference to administrative agencies rests on a similar 
delegation account.  “Deference under Chevron to an agency’s construction of a statute that it administers,” 
the Court has explained, “is premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit 
delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.”  FDA v Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp, 529 US 120, 159 (2000), citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 US 
837, 844 (1984).  Under Chevron, however, agencies are not precluded from changing their interpretations 
(and, indeed, Chevron itself involved a revised agency interpretation).  See, for example, National Cable & 
Telecommunications Association v Brand X Internet Services, 545 US 967, 981 (2005) (“Agency 
inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency’s interpretation under the 
Chevron framework.”). 
179  See, for example, McDonald v City of Chicago, 130 S Ct 3020, 3050 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring)  (“Despite my misgivings about Substantive Due Process as an original matter, I have 
acquiesced in the Court’s incorporation of certain guarantees in the Bill of Rights ‘because it is both long 
established and narrowly limited.’  Albright v Oliver, 510 U. S. 266, 275 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).”). 
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“exception” to his originalism that is based on interests in stability.180  Similarly, Robert 
Bork accepted that a decision “may be clearly incorrect but nevertheless have become so 
embedded in the life of the nation, so accepted by the society, so fundamental to the 
private and public expectations of individuals and institutions, that the result should not 
be changed now.”181  But interests in stability and related rule-of-law considerations, such 
as consistency, predictability, reliance, and transparency, also can be advanced by 
adhering to longstanding practices, regardless of whether they date to the early post-
Founding period.182  Madison, it is worth repeating, grouped judicial precedent and 
political practices together.183 	  
 There are, to be sure, statements in a number of Supreme Court decisions 
suggesting that practices dating back to near the Founding can “fix[] the construction” to 
be given to constitutional provisions.184  Those statements, however, do not contend that 
this is the only way in which constitutional meaning may legitimately be affected by 
practice.  Moreover, those statements do not envision that meaning would become fixed 
merely as a result of the initial practice; rather, they expressly require longstanding 
acquiescence in the interpretation that was adopted.  This is also true of Justice Scalia’s 
acknowledgment in Noel Canning that it would be appropriate to look to practices 
“unchallenged since the early days of the Republic.”185  As a result, those statements do 
not appear to share the premise of the liquidation approach (as understood by scholars 
like Caleb Nelson) that the initial post-Founding generation was delegated the authority 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180  See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:  Federal Courts and the Law 139-40 
(Princeton, 1997). 
181 Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America:  The Political Seduction of the Law 158 (Free Press, 
1990). 
182 See Bradley & Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 427-28 (cited in note 95); Posner & Vermeule, 
156 U Pa L Rev at 999 (cited in note 127); Cass R. Sunstein, Originalism v. Burkeanism:  A Dialogue Over 
Recess, 126 Harv L Rev F 126, 128 (2013).  Cf Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: 
An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 NYU L Rev 570, 588 (2001) (noting that stare decisis 
“promotes stability, protects settled expectations, and conserves judicial resources”). 
183  Some originalists accept judicial precedent not as a pragmatic exception to originalism but as 
part of Article III judicial power, and so in that way might be able to reconcile an acceptance of judicial 
precedent with a rejection of non-judicial precedent, depending on their grounds for accepting certain 
judicial precedents and not others.  See McGinnis & Rappaport (cited in note 137). 
184 See Myers v United States, 272 US 52, 175 (1926) (“[A] contemporaneous legislative 
exposition of the Constitution, when the founders of our Government and framers of our Constitution were 
actively participating in public affairs, acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the construction to be 
given its provisions.”); McGrain v Daugherty, 273 US 135, 174 (1927) (“So, when their practice in the 
matter is appraised according to the circumstances in which it was begun and to those in which it has been 
continued, it falls nothing short of a practical construction, long continued, of the constitutional provisions 
respecting their powers, and therefore should be taken as fixing the meaning of those provisions, if 
otherwise doubtful.”); Stuart v Laird, 5 US (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) (“[P]ractice and acquiescence under 
it for a period of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an 
irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the construction.”).  Although the Court in Stuart v Laird 
referenced acquiescence only for a period of several years, it is worth remembering that there were not 
many years to speak of in 1803.   
185 134 S Ct at 2594. 
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to fix constitutional meaning.  Instead, the statements in those decisions suggest that 
meaning would become fixed only if later generations continued to accept the early 
interpretation.  The idea of fixation through longstanding acceptance of a practice, 
however, is fully consistent with a historical gloss approach to constitutional 
interpretation.	  
 
IV.  Historical Practice and the Constitutional Text 
 
 Arguments based on historical practice are common in the area of separation of 
powers, but the constitutional text is almost always treated as controlling when it is 
perceived to be clear, even in the face of contrary historical practice.  Indeed, it is 
generally agreed that when the text is clear, it controls. As we will explain, however, 
historical practice can affect perceptions about the clarity or ambiguity of the text.  This 
phenomenon, which we have referred to elsewhere as “constructed constraint,”186 is 
evident in Noel Canning.   
 
A.  The Modality of Textual Argumentation 
 
It is widely accepted that the constitutional text is controlling when it is perceived 
to be clear.  More precisely, it is widely agreed that the constitutional text must be 
followed when it is understood to be (i) clear, (ii) applicable to the constitutional question 
under consideration, and (iii) comprehensive in the sense that the text says all that there is 
to be said about the question.  It is almost never an acceptable move in constitutional 
practice to argue for a disregard of the text.187 
   
 Only occasionally does one encounter suggestions to the contrary.  For example, 
during the oral argument in Noel Canning, Justice Scalia repeatedly asked the Solicitor 
General whether longstanding practice ever could trump clear constitutional text.188  The 
Solicitor General replied that such practice, at least if it extended back to the Founding, 
could trump clear text.189  He also stressed, however, that it would be “extremely 
unlikely” for longstanding practice to develop in a way that is contrary to clear text.190  
Unlike the Solicitor General, neither the majority nor Justice Scalia in Noel Canning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 See Bradley & Siegel, Constructed Constraint (cited in note 11). 
 187 For example, while Jack Balkin and David Strauss, two prominent constitutional theorists, 
disagree about why clear text possesses that degree of interpretive authority, they emphatically agree that it 
does.  See Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism 3, 55 (Belknap, 2011), and David A. Strauss, The Living 
Constitution 102-03 (Oxford, 2010).   
188 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 6-8 (cited in note 66). 
189 Id at 6, 8. 
190 See id at 8.  Not surprisingly, when Justice Alito asked counsel for Noel Canning the same 
question, he said that in such a situation “the language has to govern.”  Id at 42.  Justice Kagan, however, 
questioned his answer.  See id at 43.  Justice Breyer also pointed out that both the Due Process Clause and 
the Commerce Clause had acquired meanings different from what the language of those clauses might 
suggest.  See id at 48. 
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suggested that practice—or any other modality for that matter—could trump clear text.191  
Instead, the majority repeatedly stated that it was relying on non-textual modalities only 
because it concluded that the text of the Recess Appointments Clause was ambiguous.192  
The majority thus seemed to embrace the proposition, emphasized by Justice Scalia, that 
clear text is controlling, regardless of other considerations.193  
 
 In that regard, the Justices in Noel Canning were reflecting the orthodox view in 
American constitutional interpretation.  Similarly, in numerous prior decisions, the 
Supreme Court has endorsed the proposition that the modality of textual argumentation is 
distinct from the other modalities, and that non-textual modalities may appropriately be 
considered only to resolve ambiguities in the text. 194  Moreover, when dissenting 
opinions invoke that proposition, the majority does not contest it; instead, the majority 
typically argues that the text is unclear, inapplicable, or not a comprehensive provision.195  
The proposition that clear text is controlling has rhetorical power exactly because of the 
widely shared understanding that it is effectively an incontestable principle of American 
constitutional interpretation. 
 
 Of particular relevance to this Article, that shared understanding means that the 
constitutional text has rhetorical primacy over claims based on historical practice.  In 
addition, as Michael Dorf has observed, the constitutional text tends to have the effect of 
crowding out freestanding claims based upon practice even when those claims do not 
contradict the text.196  As a result, practice-based claims generally must be connected in 
some fashion to the text.  That is not, however, an inevitable effect of having a legal text.  
Under international law, for example, custom is a free-standing source of law that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Dissenting in INS v Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983) (discussed above at text at notes 115-117), 
Justice White emphasized the longstanding practice of legislative vetoes but did not claim that such 
practice could override clear text.  Instead, he argued that there was a “silence of the Constitution on the 
precise question.”  Id at 977 (White, J., dissenting).  Specifically, White reasoned that the Presentment 
Clause applies to exercises by Congress of “original lawmaking authority,” and that “[t]he power to 
exercise a legislative veto is not the power to write new law without bicameral approval or presidential 
consideration.”  Id at 979-80.    
192 See 134 S Ct at 2561 (“The constitutional text is thus ambiguous.”); id at 2568 (“The question 
is whether the Clause is ambiguous.”); id at 2577 (“We believe that the Clause’s text, standing alone, is 
ambiguous.”). 
193 See, for example, id at 2617 (Scalia, J, concurring in the judgment) (“What the majority needs 
to sustain its judgment is an ambiguous text and a clear historical practice.”). 
194 See, for example, Reid v Covert, 354 US 1, 8 n.7 (1957) (plurality opinion) (“This Court has 
constantly reiterated that the language of the Constitution where clear and unambiguous must be given its 
plain evident meaning.”).     
195 Compare, for example, Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida, 517 US 44, 116 n13 (1996) 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (“[P]lain text is the Man of Steel in a confrontation with ‘background principle[s]’ 
and ‘postulates which limit and control . . . .’”) (citations omitted), with id at 69 (“The dissent’s lengthy 
analysis of the text of the Eleventh Amendment is directed at a straw man . . . .”).  
  196 See Michael C. Dorf, How the Written Constitution Crowds Out the Extraconstitutional Rule of 
Recognition, in The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution 69 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einer 
Himma eds, Oxford, 2009). 
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operates alongside written treaties, and it can operate even in opposition to that written 
law.197  Custom does not work that way in U.S. constitutional law.  On the contrary, 
while “judges sometimes admit that constitutional interpretation is sensitive to historical 
evolution and that history adds a ‘gloss’ on the text,” those same judges “never admit to 
deriving the authority for the decision from outside the constitutional text.”198  Consistent 
with that phenomenon, the majority in Noel Canning claimed only that historical practice 
was “an important interpretive factor.”199 
 
B.  Constructed Constraint 
 
We have argued elsewhere that the orthodox view of the role of the constitutional 
text is correct as far as it goes, but that it does not go far enough.200  When the 
constitutional text is perceived to be clear, applicable, and comprehensive, it acts as a 
meaningful constraint on constitutional interpretation by limiting and shaping 
argumentation and thereby affecting the available courses of conduct that will be 
considered constitutional.  The perceived clarity or ambiguity of the text, however, is 
often partially constructed by “extra-textual” considerations.  More precisely, the 
perceived clarity or ambiguity of the text is not only a product of typical “plain meaning” 
considerations such as dictionary definitions and linguistic conventions, but also can be 
affected by the other modalities of constitutional argumentation, which are commonly 
thought to come into play only in resolving ambiguities in the meaning of the text.201  In 
other words, perceived textual clarity is not just some linguistic fact of the matter that 
exists apart from the overall process of constitutional interpretation. 
 
Our theory of constructed constraint resurrects certain insights from the Critical 
Legal Studies movement in the 1980s, without accepting the claim of some CLS scholars 
in constitutional law that there are no limits on the extent to which textual clarity is 
subject to extra-textual construction.202  Under our account, the clarity and ambiguity of 
the constitutional text is partially constructed, but in any given situation there are limits 
on the extent to which construction is available, including limits on the degree to which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 See, for example, Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102 
n.4 (1987) (“Provisions in international agreements are superseded by principles of customary international 
law that develop subsequently, where the parties to the agreement so intend.”). 
198 Andrezj Rapaczynski, The Ninth Amendment and the Unwritten Constitution:  The Problems of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 64 Chi-Kent L Rev 177, 192 (1988) 
 199 134 S Ct at 2560. 
200 See Bradley & Siegel, Constructed Constraint (cited in note 11). 
201 When referring to “ambiguity” in this Part, we do so in the loose way that the Supreme Court 
often does—that is, as a reference both to situations in which the applicability of the text to particular 
circumstances is unclear (what legal philosophers would term “vagueness”) and to situations in which the 
text could mean more than one specific thing (what legal philosophers would term “ambiguity”).  See, for 
example, Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 Const Comm 95, 97-98 
(2010).  While the distinction between vagueness and ambiguity is important in some contexts, the 
distinction is not material for our account of constructed constraint. 
202 For a discussion, see Bradley & Siegel, Constructed Constraint (cited in note 11). 
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interpreters can persuasively identify textual workarounds in the face of constraining text.  
For example, under ordinary circumstances, almost no one would be persuaded by a 
“purposive” construction of the various clauses in the Constitution imposing age 
qualifications for federal offices—for example, a claim that someone under the age of 
thirty-five lawfully could be elected president as long as he or she had a certain level of 
maturity, or a claim that the age requirement is actually higher than thirty five because, 
with increasing longevity, people tend to mature more slowly today.  Similarly, even 
though before ratification of the Twenty-Second Amendment presidents sometimes 
contemplated violating an unwritten norm against running for a third term (and Franklin 
Roosevelt did so), after the Amendment no one seriously contemplates that possibility.203  
  
In many other instances, however, perceptions about textual clarity or ambiguity 
have been subject to construction.  For example, there is a consensus that the First 
Amendment applies to the entire federal government, not just to Congress, 
notwithstanding the express and distinctive textual limitation of the Amendment’s 
strictures to Congress.204  For a variety of purposive, structural, consequentialist, and 
ethos considerations, as well as extensive judicial precedent, almost all interpreters of the 
First Amendment read the text more broadly than would be suggested by traditional 
“plain meaning” considerations.  In fact, so powerful is this construction that interpreters 
typically do not even see the first word of the First Amendment.205   
 
 The construction of textual ambiguity also is evident in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
state sovereign immunity jurisprudence.  In resisting the proposition that the expanse and 
limits of the states’ sovereign immunity from private lawsuits is covered by the text of 
the Eleventh Amendment, the Court has not simply ignored the text, as some of its critics 
have suggested.  Rather, for purposive, structural, and consequentialist reasons, the Court 
has understood the Amendment as a non-comprehensive provision—that is, as not 
covering all that there is to be said about the extent of the states’ immunity from suit.  As 
the Court has explained, it has “understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so 
much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.”206  On that view, 
the Amendment was a targeted response to a mistaken Supreme Court decision, not a 
comprehensive statement of the extent of the states’ immunity from suit.  It is noteworthy 
that even the dissenters in those sovereign immunity decisions have not pushed for a 
literal approach to the Eleventh Amendment—that is, one that would disallow even 
federal question suits against states by citizens of another state while allowing such suits 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 See, for example, Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S Cal L Rev 399, 414 (1985) (“The 
parties concerned know, without litigating and without consulting lawyers, that Ronald Reagan cannot run 
for a third term . . . .”).  But see Mark V. Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in Constitutional 
Theory, 58 S Cal L Rev 683, 687 (1985) (hypothesizing a situation in which this prohibition might be 
disregarded).  Hypothesizing an unlikely scenario in which the text would be disregarded does not show 
that the text is unconstraining.  Rather, it shows only that the text is not infinitely constraining.  
204 See US Const amend I (“Congress shall make no law . . . .”). 
205 See Bradley & Siegel, Constructed Constraint (cited note 11). 
206 Blatchford v Native Village of Notak, 501 US 775, 779 (1991). 
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if brought by citizens of the state.207  Instead, for structural and purposive reasons, the 
dissenting Justices have contended that the Amendment should be interpreted as “simply 
repeal[ing] the Citizen-State Diversity Clauses of Article III for all cases in which the 
State appears as a defendant.”208 
   
 Noel Canning, too, exemplifies the construction of textual ambiguity.  While the 
majority insisted that the relevant text was ambiguous, it did not appear simply to invoke 
the other modalities of constitutional interpretation to clarify ambiguous text.  Instead, the 
majority’s decision to regard the text as ambiguous seems itself to have been affected by 
its understanding of the purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause, historical practice, 
and the consequences of an alternative interpretation.  Or, to put it differently, those 
extra-textual considerations seemed to have motivated a search for ambiguity.  That is 
most evident in the majority’s treatment of the phrase “vacancies that happen” during a 
recess.  
 
 The majority plausibly concluded that the linguistic meaning of the words “the 
Recess” was ambiguous because those words could mean either the single break between 
yearly sessions of the Senate or any substantial break in Senate business.  As a linguistic 
matter, the phrase “the Recess,” like the phrase “the person in the street,”209 can be 
understood to reference one phenomenon or multiple phenomena.210  By contrast, the 
Court’s finding of ambiguity for the phrase “vacancies that may happen” suggests 
substantial extra-textual construction.  In that part of its analysis, the Court articulated a 
thin understanding of ambiguity, allowing ready invocation of extra-textual 
considerations.  Critically for present purposes, that thin understanding seems itself to 
have been prompted in part by the extra-textual considerations. 
 
 As the Court conceded, “the most natural meaning” of the word “happen” as 
applied to the word “vacancy” is that the vacancy must occur during the recess.211  The 
Court insisted, however, that this was “not the only possible way to use the word,” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 The Eleventh Amendment provides that the federal judicial power “shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens 
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”  US Const amend XI (emphasis added). 
208 See, for example, Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida, 517 US 44, 109-10 (1996) (Souter, J., 
dissenting); Atascadero State Hospital v Scanlon, 473 US 234, 289 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
209 See, for example, Sunstein, Originalism v. Burkeanism, 126 Harv L Rev F at 127 (cited in note 
182) (“In ordinary language, a reference to ‘the car,’ or ‘the ordinary American,’ or ‘the horse’ need not 
suggest that there is only one!”).    
210 In Dred Scott v Sandford, 60 US 394, 436 (1856), the Supreme Court controversially 
interpreted the phrase “the Territory” in Article IV, Section 3, of the Constitution to mean only territory 
held by the United States at the time of the Founding, and on that basis (among others) held that Congress 
could not prohibit slavery in American territories acquired after ratification of the Constitution. 
211 It could be argued, however, that the phrase “during the recess” in the Clause modifies only 
“fill up” and not the word “happen.”  See Michael Herz, Re-Diagramming the Recess Appointments Clause 
(Jan 8, 2014), Balkinization, at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/01/re-diagramming-recess-
appointments.html. 
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because “happen” also may mean “exist.”212  The Court then reasoned that the purpose of 
the Recess Appointments Clause and historical practice supported the broader reading.  
Those extra-textual considerations were pertinent, the Court stated, because there was 
“some linguistic ambiguity.”213  Importantly, however, the only reason for the majority to 
have sought out a possible reading—but not the most natural reading—were the extra-
textual considerations.  In other words, if the Court’s understanding of the practice and 
the purpose of the Clause had not been contrary to the most natural meaning of the 
phrase, it seems unlikely that the Court would have characterized the text as ambiguous.  
But, as the Court emphasized, it was unprepared to “render illegitimate thousands of 
recess appointments reaching all the way back to the founding era.”214  Indeed, while the 
meaning of the word “happen” seems less ambiguous in context than the meaning of the 
phrase “the Recess,” there was a substantially longer historical practice bearing on the 
term “happen” than there was regarding the phrase “the Recess.”  Accordingly, the thin-
ness of the Court’s understanding of ambiguity appears to have been inversely related to 
the duration of the historical practice. 
 
Justice Scalia, by contrast, argued that the Recess Appointments Clause was clear, 
and that its clear meaning supported a substantially narrower recess appointments 
authority.  Even in his opinion, it is possible to see the influence of extra-textual 
considerations.  In particular, throughout his opinion—and not merely in response to the 
majority’s contrary arguments—Justice Scalia stressed what he believed to be the 
purpose of the Clause: to operate as “a tool carefully designed to fill a narrow and 
specific need,”215 while “preserv[ing] the Senate’s role in the appointment process.”216  
Given that understanding of the purpose of the text, Justice Scalia concluded, for 
example, that the Clause clearly prohibited the use of recess appointments to avoid 
senatorial opposition to appointees, even though such use has been characteristic of 
practice since the 1920s.  “The need [that the Clause] was designed to fill no longer 
exists,” he wrote, “and its only remaining use is the ignoble one of enabling the President 
to circumvent the Senate’s role in the appointment process.”217  Accordingly, both 
opinions in Noel Canning exemplify how perceptions of textual ambiguity or clarity can 
themselves be affected by extra-textual modalities.   
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 134 S. Ct. at 2567 (emphasis added). 
213 Id at 2573. 
214 Id at 2577. 
215 Id at 2592 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). 
216 Id at 2597. 
217 Id at 2598.  For another decision from the October 2013 Term in which the Court relied on 
extra-textual considerations in determining that the text was unclear, this time in the context of statutory 
interpretation, see Bond v United States, 134 S Ct 2077, 2090 (2014) (“In this case, the ambiguity derives 
from the improbably broad reach of the key statutory definition given the term—‘chemical weapon’—
being defined; the deeply serious consequences of adopting such a boundless reading; and the lack of any 
apparent need to do so in light of the context from which the statute arose—a treaty about chemical warfare 
and terrorism.”). 
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C.  Implications for “Constitutional Construction” 
 
As discussed earlier, a number of theorists associated with the “new originalism” 
have distinguished between “constitutional interpretation” and “constitutional 
construction.”  Under that approach, constitutional determinations that are closely linked 
to the text (“interpretation”) are distinguished from those that supplement the text 
(“construction”).  The approach is more receptive to historical practice than earlier 
originalist accounts and is also more receptive than the Madisonian liquidation approach.  
Nevertheless, the phenomenon of constructed constraint described above presents 
difficulties for the distinction that this approach seeks to make. 
  
Political scientist Keith Whittington—a prominent advocate of the distinction 
between interpretation and construction—explains that interpretation “takes the text as its 
touchstone,” whereas construction does not “deal[] so explicitly and obsessively with the 
terms of the document itself.”218  Randy Barnett similarly makes clear that construction 
primarily occurs in situations in which the semantic meaning of the constitutional text is 
unclear, such that there is not enough information “contained in the text” to resolve an 
issue.219  Lawrence Solum agrees that practitioners are in “the construction zone” when 
the constitutional text is “vague or irreducibly ambiguous.”220 
 
 Jack Balkin, in setting out his theory of “framework originalism,”221 likewise 
relies on the distinction between interpretation and construction.  In Balkin’s rendition, 
the constitutional text establishes the basic framework of governance upon which 
participants in constitutional debates can build constitutional constructions.  Balkin 
expressly distinguishes the “ascertainment of the meaning” of the text (which he calls 
“interpretation”) from the activity of constitutional construction, which he says involves 
“arguments from history, structure, ethos, consequences, and precedent.” 222  
Constructions, as Balkin further explains, “exist to fill out and implement the text.”223 
 
The phenomenon of constructed constraint, however, unsettles the distinction that 
those theorists seek to draw between interpretation and construction.  The considerations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 218 Whittington at 9 (cited in note 129); see also Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New 
American Constitution, 27 Const Comm 119, 119-20 (2010) (“Interpretive practice is supplemented 
through a process of constitutional construction. . . .  Construction picks up where interpretation leaves 
off.”). 
 219 Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 Harv JL & Pub Pol’y 65, 67 (2011); see 
also Randy Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution ch 5 (Princeton, 2004). 
 220 Solum, 82 Fordham L Rev at 458 (cited in note 136); see also Whittington, 27 Const Comm at 
120-21 (cited in note 218) (defining “the realm of construction” as “when the Constitution as written 
cannot in good faith be said to provide a determinate answer to a given question”). 
221 See generally Balkin (cited in note 187). 
 222 Id at 4. 
 223 Id at 54; see also Whittington, 27 Const Comm at 121 (cited in note 218) (“[C]onstitutional 
constructions are built within the boundaries, or to use Jack Balkin’s phrase, within the framework, of the 
interpreted Constitution.”). 
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that are relevant to construction do not merely supplement the determination of the 
meaning of the text, and they do not come into play only when the text is unclear.  
Rather, they also affect the threshold assessment of whether the text is unclear.  
Construction, in other words, not only takes place on top of the textual framework, but 
also partially determines the framework itself.  Thus, it is artificial to separate 
constitutional interpretation from (to use Solum’s phrase) the “construction zone.” 
 
One attraction of the idea of “constitutional construction,” as those theorists use 
the term, is that it makes originalism descriptively more accurate of existing practice.  In 
particular, by acknowledging the phenomenon of constitutional construction, originalists 
have accepted the insight—emphasized by critics of originalism—that the Constitution 
sometimes enacts broad principles or standards rather than specific rules, and that in 
those situations the semantic meaning of the text does not—because it cannot—resolve 
concrete cases.224  As noted earlier, that concession is too strong for some originalists.  
The theory of constructed constraint suggests, however, that originalists have conceded 
too little ground, not too much.  Participants in constitutional interpretation 
characteristically feel bound by constitutional text that they deem clear, but their 
perception of its clarity is often not determined primarily—let alone exclusively—by its 
original semantic meaning.225   
 
Accordingly, it is difficult to limit the relevance of historical practice in 
constitutional interpretation to questions falling within the new originalist “construction 
zone.”  Historical practice itself may affect perceptions of whether one is in the 
construction zone.  As a result, even constitutional construction, which is more receptive 
to historical practice than both traditional originalism and liquidation, does not go far 
enough because of its effort to strictly distinguish between textual meaning and 
construction. 
 
*     *    * 
 
Because historical gloss can both affect perceptions of textual clarity and shift 
over time, that approach to constitutional interpretation can in theory result in a 
reallocation of governmental authority and not just a resolution of ambiguity concerning 
such authority.  That possibility is the premise of Justice Scalia’s charge in Noel Canning 
that the majority was enabling executive aggrandizement by “adverse possession.”  
Although his analogy to adverse possession highlights some reasons to be cautious before 
crediting historical practice, we explain in the next Part why the analogy is largely 
misplaced.   
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 Colby, 99 Geo LJ at 731 (cited in note 136). 
225 For ways in which the theory of constructed constraint complicates other efforts in recent 
constitutional theory to distinguish between the textual and non-textual aspects of American 
constitutionalism, see Bradley & Siegel, Constructed Constraint (cited in note 11). 
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V.  Constitutional Adverse Possession 
 
 In Noel Canning, Justice Scalia repeatedly accused the majority of applying an 
“adverse possession” approach to the separation of powers.226  The majority, Justice 
Scalia complained, would allow presidents to expand their constitutional authority simply 
by acting in a certain way for a long period of time as long as Congress failed to contest 
the practice “with sufficient vigor.”227  In addition to his originalist objections, Justice 
Scalia raised two structural concerns.  First, he argued that a practice-based approach to 
the separation of powers would unduly favor the expansion of executive authority given 
various differences between the structure of Congress and that of the executive branch.  
Second, he contended that such an approach would allow Congress and the executive 
branch to disregard constitutional limitations that are designed to protect the public.  The 
majority denied the adverse possession characterization, but it did so without much 
explanation.  It did note, however, that it was considering not only historical practice but 
also constitutional text and purpose,228 presumably to contest Justice Scalia’s premise that 
the President was taking powers that originally belonged to Congress. 
 
 Justice Scalia is not the first to analogize the historical gloss approach to the 
adverse possession doctrine in property law.229  The analogy does shed some light on 
what the historical gloss approach entails and what its justifications are.  But the adverse 
possession analogy is in many ways problematic.  While Justice Scalia’s concerns should 
be taken seriously, they do not warrant a general disallowance of practice-based 
authority. 
 
A.  Problems with the Adverse Possession Analogy 
 
Under the adverse possession doctrine in property law, someone who uses 
someone else’s real property for a specified period of time can, under certain conditions, 
acquire valid ownership of the property.230  Such a doctrine might seem strange, in that it 
potentially allows what could be considered a form of theft through a wrongful act of 
trespass as long as the trespass lasts long enough.231  In analogizing the historical gloss 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 226 See 134 S Ct at 2592, 2605, 2614, 2617. 
227 Id at 2592. 
228 See id at 2578.  Scalia contended that the adverse possession label was a “characterization the 
majority resists but does not refute.”  Id at 2617. 
229 See, for example, John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility 10 (Princeton, 1993) (critically 
describing an “adverse possession” approach to presidential war powers based on presidential practice), 
and Jonathan Turley, Constitutional Adverse Possession:  Recess Appointments and the Role of Historical 
Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 2013 Wis L Rev 965, 971 (“It creates a type of constitutional 
adverse possession where the simple success of a president in usurping congressional territory is treated as 
proof of the validity of the underlying interpretation.”). 
 230 See generally Joseph William Singer, Property ch 4 (3d ed 2010). 
 231 See Henry W. Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 Harv L Rev 135, 135 (1918) (“Title 
by adverse possession sounds, at first blush, like title by theft or robbery, a primitive method of acquiring 
land without paying for it.”). 
	   43	  
approach to the adverse possession doctrine, critics are suggesting that it, too, allows 
unlawful behavior—usurpation of another branch’s authority—to become a basis for the 
lawful acquisition of power.  
 
Of course, adverse possession is a longstanding and well-accepted feature of 
property law, so it is not obvious why the analogy indicts the historical gloss approach.  
But in any event, there are several ways in which the analogy is not particularly apt. 
 
Uncertain allocations.  The original owner of a parcel of land is typically known, 
and it is clear when an alteration is being made to the owner’s rights.  The separation of 
powers, by contrast, is frequently marked by debate and uncertainty about the allocation 
of powers.  That is particularly true of constitutional provisions relating to foreign affairs, 
which Edward Corwin famously described as “an invitation to struggle for the privilege 
of directing American foreign policy.”232  But it also characterizes a number of issues of 
domestic law as well, including, for example, the authority of the President to remove 
executive officials from office,233 an “executive privilege” to withhold information from 
Congress or the courts,234 and the “legislative privilege” (concerning, among other things, 
the internal powers of the two houses of Congress).235 
 
Relying on historical practice to help resolve uncertainties about such allocations 
is different from allowing it to alter a clearly established allocation.  To be sure, as 
discussed in Part III, the perceived clarity of the Constitution’s allocations of 
governmental authority itself can be affected by historical practice, and that appears to 
have been the case in at least part of the majority opinion in Noel Canning.  Nevertheless, 
it is still true that many separation of powers disputes do not implicate allocations thought 
to be clearly established at the Founding.  Indeed, the Madisonian liquidation idea 
recognizes that possibility. 
 
As noted above, the majority in Noel Canning resisted the idea that it was 
reallocating authority.  Instead, the majority insisted that the relevant constitutional text 
was ambiguous regarding both intra-session appointments and pre-existing vacancies.  
Moreover, while the majority placed particular emphasis on modern practice in its 
interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause, it did not concede that the early 
practice clearly established or confirmed a contrary constitutional interpretation.  Indeed, 
the majority pointed out that, as a practical matter, Justice Scalia’s approach would 
reallocate authority, as it “would render illegitimate thousands of recess appointments 
reaching all the way back to the founding era.”236  That concern highlights the more 
general point that the application of originalism can require dramatic changes in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 232 Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers 171 (NYU, 4th ed 1957).  
233  See, for example, Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive: 
Presidential Power from Washington to Bush (Yale, 2008). 
234 See, for example, Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U Pa L Rev 1383 (1974).  
235 See, for example, Josh Chafetz, Democracy’s Privileged Few 10-19 (Yale, 2007). 
236 134 S Ct at 2577.  
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landscape of constitutional law, even as it purports to resist the idea of constitutional 
change outside of the Article V amendment process.237  
 
Implications of acquiescence.  Another distinction between property law and the 
separation of powers concerns the implications of acquiescence.  Under most accounts of 
historical gloss, there must be some acquiescence in the practice by the other political 
branch of government in order for the practice to be credited.  Recall, for example, 
Frankfurter’s reference to executive practices “long pursued to the knowledge of the 
Congress and never before questioned.” 238   For adverse possession, by contrast, 
acquiescence actually can destroy the adverse possessor’s claim, because the possession 
needs to be “hostile.”239  Given that difference, historical gloss sounds at least partly in 
contractual course of dealing rather than property terms and therefore does not present 
the same concern about the acquisition of rights through “theft.”240   To be sure, 
acquiescence is a fraught concept in the separation of powers, especially when based on 
mere silence or inaction.  As discussed below in Section C, however, the difficulties with 
that concept suggest caution about inferring acquiescence, not abandonment of the 
concept. 
 
Concurrent versus exclusive rights.  Another potential difficulty with the analogy 
concerns the results of adverse possession.  When successful in property law, it results in 
a complete transfer of property rights, such that the original owner can now be excluded 
from using the property.  While it is possible to imagine historical practice supporting a 
claim of exclusive congressional or executive authority, in many instances its invocation 
shows no more than concurrent authority.  For example, in foreign affairs areas such as 
war powers, executive agreements, the termination of treaties, and the like, substantial 
historical practice supports unilateral presidential authority, but little practice establishes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 See, for example, Jack Balkin, Is Noel Canning a Victory for the Living Constitution? 
Constitutional Interpretation in an Age of Political Polarization (Sept 24, 2014) (“Scalia’s argument in 
Noel Canning is radical, not in the sense of being left-wing, but radical in the sense of seeking to return to 
the root of things and argue them once again based on first principles.”), online at 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/09/is-noel-canning-victory-for-living.html. 
238 Youngstown, 343 US at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J, concurring).  See also, for example, Michael J. 
Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 BU L Rev 109, 134 (1984) 
(contending that in order for historical practice to be credited in discerning the separation of powers, the 
other branch must have been on notice of the practice and “must have acquiesced” in it); Peter J. Spiro, 
War Powers and the Sirens of Formalism, 68 NYU L Rev 1339, 1356 (1993) (reviewing Ely (cited in note 
229)  (“[T]he other branch must have accepted or acquiesced in the action.”).   
239 See Singer at 149 (cited in note 230) (noting that “all states require the adverse possessor to 
show that possession was not permissive”). 
 240 To the extent that historical gloss is premised only on the acquiescence of the affected branch, 
it is not thought to require an actual agreement or bargain between the branches.  Cf Aziz Z. Huq, The 
Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 Colum L Rev 1595 (2014) (considering how allocations of 
authority between governmental institutions that are the product of “interbranch bargains” should be 
treated).  In Noel Canning, for example, the majority did not claim that Congress or the Senate had 
authorized the President to exercise a broad recess appointments authority.  Rather, it claimed that the 
Senate had not taken “any formal action . . . to call into question” intra-session recess appointments and had 
not “countered th[e] practice” of filling pre-existing vacancies.  See 134 S Ct at 2564, 2573. 
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that Congress is disabled from restricting or regulating that authority.  In other words, 
separation of powers custom does not yield many instances of a disallowance of 
congressional regulation—that is, situations in which the President would prevail under 
Justice Jackson’s third category from Youngstown.241  To the extent that custom-based 
presidential authority is considered non-exclusive, it is more analogous to some sort of 
license or easement than to adverse possession.242  
 
Moreover, even when historical gloss does produce something like exclusive 
executive authority, Congress often will be able to regulate it indirectly.  That appears to 
be true, for example, for recess appointments.  As a result of the majority’s decision in 
Noel Canning, presidents are permitted to make recess appointments during substantial 
intra-session as well as inter-session recesses, and can do so for vacancies that predate the 
recess.  In a sense, that authority resembles an exclusive property right.  As the majority 
made clear, however, Congress or one of its houses can take various actions to restrict the 
exercise of that right.  Options include not taking a substantial recess that would trigger 
the recess appointments authority, breaking up a long recess with pro forma sessions, and 
using the appropriations power to disallow payment of certain recess appointees, as it 
long did (and still does to some extent) under the Pay Act. 
 
B.  Justifications for Crediting Practice 
 
Although the analogy between the adverse possession doctrine in property law 
and the separation of powers is problematic for the reasons discussed above, some of the 
justifications for allowing adverse possession have potential relevance to the separation 
of powers.  Perhaps more importantly, there are additional justifications for deferring to 
historical practice in the separation of powers context that are specific to constitutional 
law.   
 
 1.  Reasons for Allowing Adverse Possession 
 
There are a number of reasons why property law has long allowed acquisitions 
through longstanding use.  Some of the reasons are historical and, as such, are specific to 
property law, but there are functional justifications as well.  Some of the most commonly 
cited justifications include:  promoting clarity of title; encouraging the most productive 
use of the resource; protecting reasonable expectation interests; and incentivizing the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 241 See Youngstown, 343 US at 637 (Jackson, J, concurring) (“When the President takes measures 
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can 
rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the 
matter”). 
242 This is not to suggest that the President is entirely lacking in exclusive authority, and the 
pending Zivotofsky case may address the boundaries of such authority as it concerns the recognition of 
foreign governments.  See Zivotofsky v Secretary of State, 725 F3d 197 (DC Cir 2103), cert. granted, 134 S 
Ct 1873 (2014).  Even there, however, the practice better supports presidential unilateralism relating to 
recognition than it does exclusive presidential authority.  See, for example, Robert J. Reinstein, Is the 
President’s Recognition Power Exclusive?, 86 Temple L Rev 1 (2013).  But other modalities of 
constitutional interpretation, such as inferences from the constitutional structure and consequentialist 
considerations, may help to compensate for ambiguities in the practice. 
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monitoring and policing of boundaries.243  It is instructive to consider how those 
justifications might map onto a practice-based approach to the separation of powers. 
 
 Clarity of title.  By vesting title in a possessor of land after a prescribed period of 
time, the adverse possession doctrine can help to clarify title by eliminating potential 
disputes.  At first glance, that justification seems to have little relevance to the historical 
gloss method of interpretation, given the lack of any specified period in which separation 
of powers custom becomes a legal entitlement.  Moreover, a custom of exercising 
particular powers is likely to be more amorphous than a custom of using land.  Indeed, it 
is an almost inevitable feature of custom-based claims that there will be disputes about 
the scope of what the practice covers.244    
 
Nevertheless, there might be instances in which crediting longstanding practice is 
the best way of achieving clarity in the distribution of constitutional authority.  For 
example, sometimes the constitutional text is unclear or silent about a particular issue of 
authority, in which case the practice may offer the most concrete decisional material.  To 
take one example, the text describes how treaties are to be made by the United States but 
says nothing about how they are to be terminated.  Allowing longstanding practice to 
resolve the issue might provide more clarity than having the issue continually subject to 
(potentially new) arguments about the implications of text or original understandings.245  
Similarly, for war powers, once it is conceded that the President has some (but not 
unlimited) constitutional power to direct the use of military force without congressional 
authorization beyond repelling attacks, it may be difficult to discern the boundary of that 
power without at least some consideration of past practice.246 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 See Singer at 155-62 (cited in note 230). 
 244 See, for example, Martin S. Flaherty, Post-Originalism, 68 U Chi L Rev 1089, 1105 (2001) 
(reviewing David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress:  The Jeffersonians, 1801-29 (Chicago, 2000)) 
(“As a theoretical matter, custom has its own problems.  Not least among these are the questions of what 
counts as the relevant custom, at what level of generality, and for how long.”).  Cf Michael D. Ramsey, The 
Limits of Custom in Constitutional and International Law, 50 San Diego L Rev 867 (2013) (attempting to 
distinguish between applications of custom that do not involve contested value judgments and those that 
do); Frederick Schauer, Pitfalls in the Interpretation of Customary Law, in The Nature of Customary Law 
27 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James Bernard Murphy eds, Cambridge, 2007) (noting that custom always 
can be described at differing levels of generality).  
245 Modern practice supports a unilateral presidential authority to terminate treaties, although that 
does not appear to have been the general understanding in the nineteenth century.  See Curtis A. Bradley, 
Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 Tex L Rev 773, 800-01 (2014).   
 246 Cf Spiro, 68 NYU L Rev at 1355 (cited in note 238) (“Ultimately, war powers law does not 
lend itself to refined parchment solutions.  It is rather the ‘court of history,’ an accretion of interaction 
among the branches, that gives rise to basic norms governing the branches’ behavior in the area.”); Jane C. 
Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War Powers Today:  Why Methodology Matters, 106 Yale LJ 
845, 876 (1996) (reviewing Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power (Kansas, 1995)) (“[W]here the 
constitutional text is genuinely ambiguous or silent, as it is regarding issues such [as] the President’s power 
as Commander in Chief to deploy forces abroad for foreign policy purposes in peacetime or the precise 
scope of the President’s authority to ‘repel sudden attacks,’ longstanding and consistent historical practice 
can shed light on how we should understand the President’s constitutional power today.”). 
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 Encouraging productive use.  Another potential justification for allowing the 
acquisition of property rights through adverse possession is that it will encourage 
productive use of the property.  Again, the fit with separation of powers is not 
immediately obvious.  Nevertheless, it might be argued that, when one branch assumes 
authority that potentially falls within the prerogatives of the other branch, and continues 
to exercise that authority for a long period of time without substantial objection, it is 
likely that, as between the two branches, the actor exercising the authority is the best 
positioned to use it.247 
 
Originalists understandably will object that, for better or worse, the Constitution 
settled the question of allocations of authority.  One problem with the originalist position, 
however, is that the Founders’ functional assessments do not take account of genuinely 
monumental changes in the nature of governance and international relations.  Consider, 
for example, the rise of the administrative state.  Even if the widespread delegation by 
Congress of what amounts to lawmaking authority to administrative agencies seems to 
offend original understandings of the separation of powers, the Founders could not have 
anticipated the nature of the modern national economy or the widely expected role of 
government in that economy.  Another example is the rise of congressional-executive 
agreements in the twentieth century.  Even if the Founders thought that all international 
agreements needed to be approved by two-thirds of the Senate, they entertained that 
thought at a time when the United States was expected to maintain only a handful of 
bilateral treaty relationships.  The functional assessment is potentially very different in a 
post-United Nations era in which the United States has an interest in maintaining 
thousands of treaty relationships, including on many topics that overlap with the 
traditional regulatory authority of Congress (and not merely the Senate).248   
 
This is not to suggest that the judiciary always will be able to make those 
functional assessments.  The point, rather, is that the judiciary may reasonably conclude 
for some separation of powers issues that it cannot do a better job of making those 
assessments than can the political branches.  That is what the Court in Noel Canning 
seemed to suggest when it noted that “[w]e have not previously interpreted the [Recess 
Appointments] Clause, and, when doing so for the first time in more than 200 years, we 
must hesitate to upset the compromises and working arrangements that the elected 
branches of Government themselves have reached.”249  Moreover, to reiterate an earlier 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 Cf Huq, 114 Colum L Rev at 1646-56 (cited in note 240) (arguing, on efficiency and other 
grounds, against a categorical prohibition on bargains between government institutions about the exercise 
of authority); Sunstein, Minimalism, 105 Mich L Rev at 401 (cited in note 120) (“If Congress and President 
Bush have settled on certain accommodations, there is reason to believe that those accommodations make 
institutional sense.”). 
248 See, for example, Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 Harv L 
Rev 799, 805 (1995), and Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of 
International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 Yale LJ 1236 (2008).  This does not mean, however, 
that historical practice necessarily supports complete interchangeability between treaties and executive 
agreements.  See, for example, Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 
79 Tex L Rev 961 (2001). 
249 134 S Ct at 2560. 
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point, if judicial precedent can compromise original understandings (as even many 
originalists allow), historical practices of the political branches—especially those 
practices that respond to monumental changes in the world—should be able to do the 
same.  
 
 Reliance interests.  For the use of land, one reason for giving weight to 
longstanding use is that someone may have invested time and resources based on the 
belief that she would continue to reap the benefits of the investment.  The majority in 
Noel Canning seemed to be concerned that, in the separation of powers context, historical 
practice can similarly generate institutional reliance interests.  It noted, for example, that 
it was “reluctant to upset this traditional practice where doing so would seriously shrink 
the authority that Presidents have believed existed and have exercised for so long.”250  By 
contrast, in holding that Senate breaks of less then ten days are presumptively too short to 
trigger the President’s recess appointments authority, the majority said that it did not 
perceive any presidential reliance on a recess appointments power for breaks of fewer 
than ten days.251  For his part, Scalia denied that the historical practices in question had 
“created any justifiable expectations that could be disappointed by enforcing the 
Constitution’s original meaning,”252 but he did not elaborate on the claim. 
 
 In general, reliance does not appear to be an especially strong argument for 
crediting historical practice in the area of separation of powers.  After all, a branch of 
government that has been exercising a particular type of authority presumably could 
simply cease exercising the authority going forward.  Of course, there might be third-
party reliance interests created by governmental actions taken in the past,253 such as the 
NLRB decisions that had been made by recess appointees, but there are legal doctrines 
(such as the de facto officer doctrine) that might safeguard such interests.254  And while it 
seems unlikely that such doctrines always would prevent externalities, it is also possible 
that such externalities might themselves reduce the likelihood that courts would deem an 
issue justiciable.255 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250 134 S Ct at 2573. 
251 See id at 2566. 
252 Id at 2617. 
253 See, for example, United States v Midwest Oil Co., 236 US 459, 472-73 (1915) (noting that 
“officers, law-makers and citizens naturally adjust themselves to any long-continued action of the 
Executive Department—on the presumption that unauthorized acts would not have been allowed to be so 
often repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice”). 
254 See David H. Carpenter & Todd Garvey, Practical Implications of Noel Canning on the NLRB 
and CFPB (Cong Res Serv, Apr. 1, 2013), at http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/files/2013/04/Practical-
Implications.pdf. 
255 See, for example, Made in the USA Foundation v United States, 242 F3d 1300, 1318 (11th Cir 
2001) (holding that the government’s decision to conclude the NAFTA trade agreement as a 
“congressional-executive agreement” rather than as an Article II treaty presented a political question, in 
part because holding this process unconstitutional “would potentially undermine every other major 
international commercial agreement made over the past half-century”).   
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Nevertheless, there may be instances in which a longstanding exercise of 
authority is embedded in what in essence is an inter-branch bargain, pursuant to which 
the branch exercising authority has ceded another type of authority.  If a court invalidated 
only one half of such a bargain, it might unsettle reliance interests.  A possible example is 
the Senate’s practice of attaching reservations to its advice and consent to treaties.  That 
practice was novel, both domestically and internationally, when the Senate first initiated 
the practice in connection with the Jay Treaty in 1794.256  Importantly, the Senate 
developed that practice in response to the President’s effort to avoid Senate involvement 
in the treaty negotiation process, notwithstanding the Constitution’s assignment to the 
Senate of “advice and consent” authority, and it is one reason the Senate acquiesced in 
having that dual role reduced primarily to one of “consent.”  Invalidating the reservations 
authority at this late date might place the Senate in the difficult institutional and political 
position of having to recover a role in the treaty process that it has not effectively 
exercised since the early days of the nation. 
  
 Policing boundaries.  The doctrine of adverse possession is also said to give 
owners of property an incentive to monitor and police the boundaries of the property.  In 
some ways, that justification might seem to have the best fit with separation of powers, 
but in fact it highlights one of Justice Scalia’s concerns.  James Madison wrote in 
Federalist No. 51 that the separation of powers would be self-enforcing by “giving to 
those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal 
motives to resist encroachments of the others.”257  Under such a scheme, Madison 
posited, “[t]he interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the 
place,” and “[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition.”258  The possibility of 
losing a prerogative through inaction should heighten the incentive. 
 
The problem with that justification, as a number of scholars have discussed, is 
that congressional-executive relations do not work in a Madisonian fashion, at least in the 
modern era.259  In particular, because of collective action difficulties, veto-gates, the 
focus of legislators on reelection, a strong identification of individual members with 
partisan interests, and a strong dis-identification of members with the institution given its 
unpopularity, Congress as an institution does not consistently seek to protect its 
institutional prerogatives.  (One of the many signs of this phenomenon is that Congress 
lacks an institutional counterpart to the Office of Legal Counsel.)  Of course, Congress 
frequently does resist the policy initiatives of the executive branch, especially during 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 See Curtis A. Bradley, International Law in the U.S. Legal System 35-36 (Oxford, 2013).   
 257 The Federalist No. 51 at 321-22 (James Madison), in The Federalist Papers (cited in note 14). 
258 Id at 322.  We take no position here on whether or to what extent those statements in Federalist 
No. 51 reflected Madison’s actual views.  Cf. Samuel Kernell, “The True Principles of Republican 
Government”:  Reassessing James Madison’s Political Science, in James Madison:  The Theory and 
Practice of Republican Government 92, 93 (Stanford, Samuel Kernell ed, 2003) (arguing that Federalist 
No. 51 “does not represent Madison’s sincere theoretical views of the Constitution”).	  
259 See, for example, Bradley & Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 438-47 (cited in note 95); Daryl J. 
Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 Harv L Rev 
657, 671 (2011); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U Chi L Rev 865, 884 
(2007).  
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times of divided government, and it has a variety of tools for doing so.  But such 
resistance overlaps only imperfectly with institutional policing.260  
 
2.  Additional Reasons for Crediting Practice 
 
In sum, the justifications for allowing adverse possession in property law are not a 
close fit with the context of separation of powers disputes, although some of those 
justifications have partial relevance in that context.  Importantly, however, there are 
additional justifications for crediting historical practice that are more specific to the 
constitutional law of separation of powers and that are therefore not captured, at least not 
fully, by the analogy to property law. 
 
Respect for the coordinate branches.  One justification for courts to defer to 
historic governmental practices relates to the “countermajoritarian” nature of 
constitutional judicial review. 261   Although the concerns animating the 
countermajoritarian difficulty can be overstated, those concerns are particularly strong 
when both political branches share a view that is different from the judiciary’s and have 
held that view for a long time.  Judicial deference to the longstanding practices of the 
political branches can reduce those concerns.  That is true regardless of whether one 
holds a “judicial supremacist” or a “departmentalist” view of constitutional interpretation.  
That is because the issue is not whether the Supreme Court should be understood as 
having the last word on constitutional issues, but rather how much respect it should give 
to the considered views of other constitutional actors when it decides those issues.262  
This justification for giving weight to the practices of the political branches is most 
applicable when there is evidence that those branches understand the practice in 
constitutional terms. 
 
Limits on judicial authority and capacity.  Deference to historical practice also 
can reflect limitations on judicial authority and capacity.  Part of the idea here is that if 
the judiciary is too assertive in disturbing institutional practices, it risks having its 
judgments ignored by the political branches.  It is in part for this reason that courts will 
likely be reluctant, for example, to decide the constitutionality of a war.  But even 
assuming that the political branches will adhere to judicial decisions policing the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260 Thus, the majority in Noel Canning was too casual in suggesting that “the Senate, like the 
President, has institutional ‘resources,’ including political resources, ‘available to protect and assert its 
interests.’”  134 S Ct at 2569, quoting Goldwater v Carter, 444 US 996, 1004 (1979).  See Bradley & 
Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 446 (cited in note 95). 
 261  On the “countermajoritarian difficulty,” see generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Least 
Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 16-23 (1962).  For a recent critique of this 
purported difficulty, see generally Barry Friedman, The Will of the People (Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 
2009). 
262 Cf City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 535-36 (1997) (“Our national experience teaches that 
the Constitution is preserved best when each part of the government respects both the Constitution and the 
proper actions and determinations of the other branches.”).  For a judicial supremacist, deference to 
longstanding historical practice is unlike deference to a statute that responds to an unpopular judicial 
decision.  Notably, Justice Kennedy wrote the “judicial supremacist” opinion of the Court in Boerne and 
yet also joined the majority in Noel Canning.   
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relationship between legislative and executive power, not all aspects of that relationship 
are reducible to justiciable cases and controversies appropriate for judicial resolution.  
For instance, courts will not always have a sense of whether a given practice by one 
political branch truly intrudes upon the prerogatives or powers of the other, or what the 
ripple effects will be if the judiciary changes the status quo ante in a fundamental way.  
Moreover, the judicial tools for remedying such intrusions may be rather blunt and 
imprecise.  If Justice Scalia’s view had prevailed in Noel Canning, for example, it likely 
would have resulted in the end of the President’s recess appointments power as a 
practical matter, given the relatively short length of modern inter-session recesses.  
 
Constitutional updating.  Another reason to credit historic governmental practice 
in separation of powers disputes is that the U.S. Constitution is very old and difficult to 
amend, and so is subject to serious “dead hand” objections.  Crediting historic practice in 
the area of separation of powers allows the Constitution to evolve in response to the 
changing needs of the government.  To reconcile that feature with the rhetorical appeal of 
originalism and textualism, historical practice is frequently described as an “interpretive 
gloss” rather than as a free-standing claim of constitutional meaning.  At least in theory, 
that gloss is available only where the textual assignments of authority are unclear or 
incomplete, although, as discussed above, it seems likely that there is a feedback loop 
whereby perceptions of clarity and coverage are themselves affected by practice.  
 
 3.  Role of Judicial Review 
 
The last point—about constitutional updating—implicates an inherent tension 
between the benefits of customary evolution and centralized judicial review.  Given the 
authority that federal courts possess in our constitutional system today, practice is likely 
to coordinate around judicial decisions.  As a result, a judicial decision crediting practice 
has the potential to freeze the practice in place.  That possibility might counsel courts to 
pursue an approach that Cass Sunstein has called “judicial minimalism” when they 
engage with customary practice, particularly where it appears that the practice is still in 
flux.263  In some instances, it might even suggest judicial abstention altogether, through 
the political question doctrine or other mechanisms.  
 
For example, in the Jerusalem passport case that has now returned to the Supreme 
Court, Zivotofsky v Secretary of State, 264 the Court, having previously rejected the 
applicability of the political question doctrine,265 is confronted with a choice between two 
potentially problematic options:  endorsing executive disregard of a statute, or allowing 
congressional intrusion in sensitive Middle East diplomacy in a manner that is contrary to 
longstanding executive branch positions held by Presidents of both parties.  In a case like 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 See Sunstein, Minimalism (cited in note 120).  One can approve of minimalism in this context 
without approving of it as a general approach to constitutional adjudication.  For a general critique, see Neil 
S. Siegel, A Theory In Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 
Mich L Rev 1951 (2005). 
264 725 F3d 197 (DC Cir 2103), cert. granted, 134 S Ct 1873 (2014). 
265 See note 91. 
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that one, some uncertainty about the distribution of authority may be optimal.  In other 
words, unlike in property law, clarity of title may not always be the desired aim in the 
area of separation of powers.   
 
Furthermore, if one is concerned about the growth of executive power, one should 
not assume that more robust judicial review will be a corrective, because it is possible, if 
not probable, that courts will end up legitimating many exercises of executive 
authority.266  For example, interpreters who regard the justiciability of Zivotofsky as a 
close question may be inclined to favor resolving a similarly close question on the merits 
in such a way as to preserve the state of affairs that would have prevailed in the absence 
of judicial intervention.267  In Zivotofsky, that would mean holding in favor of the 
President’s position. 	  
This does not mean, however, that either abstention or minimalism is always the 
best course.  For example, the majority opinion in Noel Canning was closer to 
maximalism than to minimalism.  It decided all three of the questions before it, even 
though the case could have been resolved on the narrowest ground, which concerned the 
minimum length of a recess and the effect of the pro forma sessions.   
 
On balance, we think the majority’s decision to resolve all three issues made 
sense.  First, the historical practice concerning both intra-session appointments and pre-
vacancy appointments was well established before the D.C. Circuit’s decision in the case, 
and further customary evolution was unlikely.  Second, the decision of the D.C. Circuit 
was itself maximalist, and it would have been left in place had the Supreme Court ruled 
narrowly.  Third, because appointments to bodies like the NLRB implicate the legitimacy 
of administrative decisionmaking, with a multitude of consequences for third parties, 
there were strong reasons for not leaving the questions unsettled in the face of the new 
uncertainty.268  Fourth, other cases already were pending in the lower courts that 
implicated the broader questions,269 so a minimalist approach would not have had much 
effect in terms of clearing space for a non-judicial resolution.  Finally, as noted above, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266 Cf Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U Chi L Rev 1743, 
1752 (2013) (“[A]rguments for ‘Madisonian’ judging go wrong by assuming that judges stand outside the 
Madisonian system.”). 
267 We are not suggesting that the Court should decide the merits of a case incorrectly in order to 
take proper account of justiciability concerns.  We are instead suggesting that, in cases presenting close 
questions both of justiciability and on the merits, justiciability concerns may have a role to play in tipping 
the balance one way or the other even after the Court decides to reach the merits.  Cf Bradley & Morrison, 
126 Harv L Rev at 430 (cited in note 95) (suggesting that the political question doctrine and the historical 
gloss method of interpretation can be viewed as simply reflecting different degrees of deference to political 
branch practice); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 
Harv L Rev 1274, 1306 (2006) (“Viewed along a spectrum, a determination of nonjusticiability due to the 
absence of judicially manageable standards is simply the limiting case of a decision to underenforce 
constitutional norms.”).  
 268 Cf Siegel, 103 Mich L Rev at 2007 (cited in note 263) (emphasizing that judicial minimalism 
may compromise the guidance function of the rule of law). 
269 See 134 S Ct at 2558. 
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decision in Noel Canning leaves the Senate with several options for resisting broad 
exercises of the recess appointments power, so the effect of the decision on the relative 
balance of authority between the branches may be relatively modest. 
 
C.  Executive Aggrandizement and Individual Liberty 
 
 Despite those potential justifications for crediting historical practice in the area of 
separation of powers, Justice Scalia’s two objections are serious ones.  First, he expressed 
concern that a practice-based approach to the separation of powers would unduly favor 
the expansion of executive authority.  “In any controversy between the political branches 
over a separation-of-powers question,” Justice Scalia noted, “staking out a position and 
defending it over time is far easier for the Executive Branch than for the Legislative 
Branch.”270  Crediting practice, he therefore argued, will allow the President to continue 
accreting power vis-à-vis Congress over time.   
 
 That concern has force, and one of us has emphasized it elsewhere. 271  
Nevertheless, it suggests caution in crediting historical practice, not a rejection of it.  One 
way to reduce the concern would be calibrate the test for historical gloss in a way that 
would take account of the institutional realities of the congressional-executive 
relationship.  For example, given the diminished incentive of members of Congress to 
challenge the President if he or she is of the same party, more weight should be given to 
acquiescence in practice by the opposing party as well as non-acquiescence by the same 
party.272  In addition, to take account of Congress’s greater collective action difficulties 
as compared with the executive branch, mere congressional inaction or silence rarely 
should be considered sufficient to constitute legally significant acceptance of a practice.  
Relatedly, evidence of congressional non-acquiescence should extend beyond the 
enactment of opposing statutes and should include various forms of congressional “soft 
law,” such as committee reports and non-binding resolutions.273  And, in those instances 
in which Congress actually has managed to enact legislation restricting executive 
authority without constitutional objection from the President, arguments for contrary 
executive authority based on practice should be viewed with skepticism.274  At the same 
time, when Congress has actively regulated in an area, what it chooses not to regulate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 Id at 2605, citing Bradley & Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 439-47 (cited in note 95). 
 271 See Bradley & Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 438-47 (cited in note 95). 
272 See id at 454. 
273 For discussions of congressional soft law, see Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U Pa 
L Rev 716 (2012), and Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 
61 Stan L Rev 573 (2008).  The majority in Noel Canning may have given a nudge to the consideration of 
soft law in noting that, “neither the Senate considered as a body nor its committees, despite opportunities to 
express opposition to the practice of intra-session recess appointments, has done so.”  134 S Ct at 2563 
(emphasis added).  
274 For example, the existence of the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which limited 
and regulated electronic surveillance, should have made the Bush administration’s practice-based 
arguments in support of a broader surveillance power difficult to sustain.  See Bradley & Morrison at 449 
(cited in note 95).  
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potentially can be evidence of acquiescence, because in those instances Congress by 
assumption has overcome at least some of its collective action difficulties. 
 
Given the greater ability and incentives of the executive branch to defend its 
institutional prerogatives, the test for executive acquiescence in assertions of authority by 
Congress should be less stringent.  Thus, for example, longstanding executive inaction in 
the face of congressional assertions of authority should receive significant weight in 
discerning congressional authority.  This point serves as a reminder that, although 
historical gloss is frequently invoked to justify claims of executive authority (and that is 
how Frankfurter described it), there is nothing inherent in the historical gloss approach to 
the separation of powers that would preclude Congress from gaining authority through 
custom.  Indeed, as a general matter (putting aside for a moment conflicts with the 
President), Congress almost certainly has gained authority in that way.  For example, a 
key reason that the vast majority of Justices and commentators reject a narrow approach 
to Congress’s enumerated powers is that Congress long has exercised broad powers to 
tax, spend, and regulate.  Another reason, of course, is judicial precedent affirming the 
broader authority, including the McCulloch decision discussed in Part II.  But it is easy to 
forget that deferring to such precedent itself can allow a form of “adverse possession,” 
albeit by one group of Supreme Court Justices vis-a-vis a later group. 
 
 In Noel Canning, the majority’s decision to credit the historical practice of broad 
presidential exercise of the recess appointments power is defensible even in light of the 
cautionary approach suggested above.  That practice is longstanding and has been relied 
upon by presidents of both major political parties, during times of both unified and 
divided government.  Moreover, allowing such presidential authority does not disable 
either Congress or the Senate from taking actions to resist exercises of that authority.  
Regarding the specific practice of intra-session recess appointments, Congress has done 
nothing, either as a body or even through committee action, to resist the exercise of 
presidential authority, even when Congress otherwise has regulated in the area.  As for 
appointments to fill pre-existing vacancies, even if one concludes that the 1863 Pay Act 
signified Congress’s non-acquiescence, it seems reasonable to credit the 1940 
amendments to the Act as signifying a change of position, especially after the 
Comptroller General already had observed in 1927 that presidential authority to make 
those appointments was settled.  
 
 Scalia’s second objection was that third-party interests are at stake in the 
distribution of institutional authority.  In particular, Scalia emphasized that the purpose of 
distributing governmental authority is not to provide particular entitlements to the 
branches per se, but rather to protect liberty by diffusing power.  Again, that is a 
legitimate concern, but it paints too broadly. 
 
 As an initial matter, protecting liberty may be a central justification for the 
Constitution’s checks and balances, but that is only one aspect of the separation of 
powers.  Another aspect is the distribution of authority in a manner that enables effective 
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governance.275  Liberty is also a deeply contested concept, and effective governance may 
itself be essential for the promotion of a positive conception of liberty.  Moreover, even 
under a purely negative conception of liberty, effective governance may be essential for 
liberty in the long term—for example, by safeguarding against external threats.  
Consistent with these points, the majority in Noel Canning quoted Alexander Hamilton 
from the first Federalist Paper for the proposition that the “vigour of government is 
essential to the protection of liberty.”276 
 
In any event, not all separation of powers issues have a direct connection to 
liberty.  The connection between liberty interests and the recess appointments issues in 
Noel Canning, for example, are abstract and attenuated.  Similarly, for other 
governmental practices that have been heavily informed by practice—such as the practice 
of having Congress rather than a supermajority of the Senate approve many international 
agreements—there is no obvious tension with individual liberty.  Of course, some 
separation of powers issues are directly connected to negative liberty.  An obvious 
example would be the separation of the power over criminal lawmaking from the powers 
over criminal law enforcement and interpretation.  This is one reason why there was so 
much concern about the Bush administration’s use of military commissions prior to the 
enactment of the Military Commissions Act.277  Importantly, as the Hamdan v Rumsfeld 
decision disallowing those commissions illustrates, it is precisely where individual liberty 
interests are most implicated that judicial review is most likely to occur, which in turn 
leaves less space for the accretion of constitutional custom.278 
 
Conclusion	  
 
 The significance of Noel Canning extends well beyond its resolution of important 
questions about the scope of the President’s recess appointments power.  The decision 
stands as one of the Supreme Court’s most significant endorsements of the relevance of 
“historical gloss” to the interpretation of the separation of powers.  More generally, Noel 
Canning exemplifies how the constitutional text, perceptions about clarity or ambiguity, 
and “extra-textual” considerations such as historical practice operate interactively rather 
than as separate elements of interpretation.  The decision also provides a useful entry 
point into critically analyzing the concept of constitutional liquidation, which the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 See Youngstown, 343 US at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“While the Constitution diffuses 
power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into 
a workable government.”). 
 276 134 S Ct at 2577. 
277 See, for example, Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 Am J Int’l 
L 337, 339 (2002) (“Fundamentally, [Bush’s] Military Order undermines the constitutional principle of 
separation of powers.”); Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 548 US 557, 638 (2006) (Kennedy, J, concurring in part) 
(“Trial by military commission raises separation-of-powers concerns of the highest order.”).  Another 
separation of powers concern relating to the commissions is that they bypass the regular federal courts, and 
that concern was not eliminated by Congress’s authorization of the commissions in 2006. 
278 Cf Boumediene v Bush, 553 US 723, 765 (2008) (“[T]he writ of habeas corpus is itself an 
indispensable mechanism for monitoring the separation of powers.”). 
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majority in Noel Canning seemed to conflate with historical gloss but which seems more 
consistent with the approach to historical practice reflected in Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence in the judgment.  Finally, the decision illustrates that the historical gloss 
approach, when applied cautiously and with sensitivity to the potential concerns that 
Justice Scalia and others have raised, is not vulnerable to the charge of licensing 
executive aggrandizement by “adverse possession.”   
